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Preface
Somewhere, there is an armed conflict. Who are “we”, who are “they” 
and what is actually happening in the operational area? If these questions 
can be answered, one has taken great steps towards being able to pre-
dict the unfolding of the events ahead in a conflict. The following book 
is presenting tools to help address these questions for primarily military 
organisations, but also for any actor collective or individual dealing with 
international conflicts. The approach is sociological and the examples are 
thought to serve as inspiration for others to work foremost with the per-
spective but perhaps also with the methods. The purpose of this book 
is to give researchers in the field of war studies and neighbouring disci-
plines inspiration and guidelines on how to apply field theory on subjects 
dealing with conflicts and problems associated with conflicts.
Leadership in conflicts are very much based both on experience and 
predictions, predictions based on these aforementioned experiences. 
These experiences are important in that they have shaped the range of 
perspectives which the actor (collective or individual) has, not all experi-
ences are equally important when it comes to making an imprint. This is 
natural and often leads the actors correctly, if not they sometimes have 
room to adapt, sometimes not. This is the logic of practice through the 
ages of military leadership. On the other hand, one of the oldest insti-
tutions in Western Civilisation is the institution of universities. Since 
the Enlightenment the universities have been in the service of bringing 
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knowledge into all areas of activities within states and society. Still, socio-
logical perspectives on warfare have often been limited to studying the 
conflict from an outside perspective without primarily being interested in 
delivering actual tools for the operators engaged in the conflict.
Stockholm, Sweden Håkan Gunneriusson
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PART I
Theory and Background Field Theory as an 
Instrument for Operational Analysis
3
Abstract  This chapter deals with why social theory can be relevant 
in the context of military operations. The chapter does also give some 
examples of what have been done before in this matter, specifically the 
concept Effect-Based Operations (EBO). The French sociologist and 
theorist Pierre Bourdieu is also introduced here.
Keywords  Effect-Based Operations (EBO) · Pierre Bourdieu · Algeria
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) first devel-
oped his theories about social fields when he made field studies in the 
North African mountain ranges, among the Kabyle in Algeria. The time 
period was the 1950s to the early 1960s, when France fought their war 
in Algeria. Even though most of the Kabyle are Muslims they are not 
Arabic, and they speak the North African Berber language kabyle. He 
then found that he could only understand them fully if he decoded the 
symbolic values which they placed on things, customs and behaviour.1 
CHAPTER 1
Terms in Search for a Theoretical Definition
© The Author(s) 2017 
H. Gunneriusson, Bordieuan Field Theory as an Instrument 
for Military Operational Analysis, New Security Challenges, 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65352-5_1
1 This text is an extension built on a synopsis paper published in “Fältperspektiv. An 
approach to achieving one’s aims in armed operations” in Studies in Education and Culture 
dedicated to Donald Broady. Ed. Börjesson et al. Uppsala, 2007. For more on both the 
background to the theory and the theory it-self see: http://www.skeptron.uu.se/broady/
sec/ske-15.pdf.
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This was a young researcher still strictly empirical, creating the founda-
tion for his theories. Just recently his book Algerian Sketches was released 
post-mortem where he writes about Algeria, the Algerian conflict and his 
theories. Later on, Bourdieu found that much of the social mechanisms 
he had found among the Kabyle were present in all manners of other 
social contexts.
Bourdieu was one of the foremost French thinkers of the late 1900s 
and had great influence on many humanist and social science disci-
plines—mainly in Europe. Those who have not read his work consider 
his thinking to be post-modern, but strictly speaking, he is not of the 
deconstructive school. He saw himself as post-structuralist, which was 
partly an acknowledgement of structuralism, but which also showed 
that it was not as embedded in his thinking with the degree of rigidity 
normally imposed by structuralism. He has, for example, done extensive 
research in the fields of art, literature and even studied his peers, the pro-
fessors in Paris as empirical material. Bourdieu might at times be hard 
to understand, but his theories are based strictly on empirical material 
which he then has generalised to theoretical systems. With the passage of 
time, he introduced new terms, for example the term field, which we will 
return to later on.
For more than a decade, I myself have used and expanded Bourdieu’s 
theories and found that there is a case to state that they are valid for 
studies and practice regarding Military Operations as well. This text 
should be seen as an introduction of the theories into the military field, 
especially regarding the field of intelligence analysis. In military context, 
the theories can be used to make social patterns visible. If you have good 
empirical material and a good analysis, then you will be able to see how 
actors (collective as well as individual) relate to each other. In the end, 
one can be both able to predict what will happen (with a certain degree 
of certainty) and able to make the other part (enemy or not) behave in a 
certain way, without them knowing that you are manipulating them.
I would like to underscore that this text is primarily focused on the 
theory and not the empirical aspect. It only serves as a way to exemplify 
the theory and show its usefulness in operational analysis. I recommend 
the bibliography at the end for those interested in the empirical events 
briefly explained in this text. It should be stressed that field theory is 
more of an object than a tool in the text. The text is primarily a tool 
for training, inspire primarily military officers how to use field analysis. 
The overall aim of this text is to present an alternative approach to 
1 TERMS IN SEARCH FOR A THEORETICAL DEFINITION  5
knowledge support. It will, in essence, explain field theory in context 
and show the theory’s potential for helping to understand certain types 
of military conflicts. This will be achieved by using the scientific theo-
retical system to create a picture of how an area of operations can be 
understood from a theoretical perspective. This will involve making a sci-
ence of military practice, by transforming scientific theory into a military 
modus operandi in the operations area.
In counterterrorisms theory with roots from the 1970s, you have 
an enemy centric approach, whereas the so-called classic counterin-
surgency has a more population centric approach.2 Both have an actor 
first perspective and do not focus on the structure. A post-structuralist 
approach will be used here, which is a mix of actor and structure per-
spective. Methods will also be examined for the creation of a social field. 
However, a field theory analysis based on an actual conflict will not be 
conducted. A completely different scale of effort would be required 
for this; the conflict itself would have to be in progress and consider-
able operational resources would be necessary. Instead, an example—the 
former Yugoslavia—will be used to show the feasibility of using field 
theory to understand a low intensity conflict. The reason why this discus-
sion will concentrate mainly on the strategic level (politico-strategic and 
military strategic) is a result of the relatively good accessibility of source 
materials. However, it would be reasonable to consider using field theory 
as an operational and tactical tool, but the source material required to 
produce illustrative examples would amount to something approaching a 
collective biography of the many actors involved.
In order to generate a theoretical discussion around operations of 
so wide-ranging nature as those in play when a country or a region is 
threatened or finds itself at war, requires a balance between generalisa-
tion and operationalisation. Theory must become a practical tool to assist 
those responsible for operational decisions. At the same time, it should 
remain at a level general enough to allow theory to link to various 
empiric scenarios without losing relevance. In this text, field theory will 
be applied to an area where it has not been used before, with empirical 
material being analysed using a field perspective. After a certain amount 
of refining, the theory becomes an even sharper tool for the analysis of 
armed conflict, in particular, peace promotion operations and operations 
2 Kilcullen (2009, p. xv).
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where information operations are prioritised. This approach will also 
require considerable information resources from the units involved. 
However, the aim is not to provide the definitive answer as to how these 
types of missions will be conducted. The aim is to offer a tool that will 
more easily enable the successful achievement of tasks for all types of 
organisations working in the area of operations. The minimum require-
ment here is for the theory to serve in a teaching role and as an eye-
opener for those who have previously not thought in wider conceptual 
terms. Ideally the model should move from its teaching role to become 
a practical tool for analysis. As an extension doctrine could be developed 
based on field theory, in particular for low intensity conflicts such as 
peace promotion operations or conflicts where manipulation of the social 
field might provide a fruitful avenue of approach.3
Before proceeding further one must acknowledge that a theory can 
never fully reflect reality, only certain aspects of it. The principal purpose 
of a theory is to identify the essential elements considered peculiar to 
the area under study; this is important because reality can often appear 
far too complex and confusing. What is essential or not is both depend-
ent on what is characteristic for the researched object, but also what 
at the same time is important for the mission itself. The field of opera-
tions described below is not an empirical reality but a heuristic tool used 
here to provide a foundation for decision makers. The theoretical model 
avoids going into detail, it merely describes an approach to an empirical 
situation. In this respect, the theory is well-suited to its purpose in that 
it does not lay down any detailed guidelines; it is the empirical reality 
that directs the practical design of the model. For example, the defini-
tion of what is important for the actors in this study is based entirely 
on the assessment of the actors themselves, the assessment is not shaped 
by theory nor is the nature of the theoretical categories determined on 
beforehand—more on this later.
When it comes to the insurgency type of warfare, we in the West have 
had the winning of hearts and minds approach in some shape or form at 
hand since the Vietnam war. The concept of Strategic communication 
3 “Low intensity conflict” is a vague term, but it may be defined as conflict that does 
not fulfil the criteria for war. The latter is itself a term with several definitions, but that low 
intensity warfare is different from high intensity warfare (i.e. war) is often considered to be 
true. It is the criteria that changes, not the relationship between the terms. Militärstrategisk 
doktrin (2002), p. 103.
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has been important and still is. Prominent authors like David Kilcullen 
and John Nagl have been proponents of this approach, even if they of 
course also realise that it is a problematic endeavour.4 A problem with 
strategic communication is that it is more of a strategic monologue. The 
concept being put forwards in strategic communication can be as basic 
in practice as building roads but should deliver the message that there is 
righteousness in our concept of why the conflict is fought. If we take the 
opposition’s ideas into account we might need to find a middle ground 
and that is not desirable, as it delegitimises the very idea of the conflict 
at home. Strategic communication is basically a monologue because the 
communicator wants it to be one and by that, it is often not very suc-
cessful as it does not appreciate the Clausewitzian concept of the conflict 
being a duel situation. The handling of the Iraq situation after the top-
pling of Saddam is a clear example of a strategic monologue with dis-
astrous effects. There was no willingness to read the situation and act 
accordingly, it was just a dictate and efforts to push that dictate out to 
the population.5 Others have underscored that the USA must improve 
when dealing with HUMINT on the tactical level.6 It is perhaps stating 
the obvious as improvement is always wanted, the real question is how.
It might also prove useful to touch on some of what has been writ-
ten about the now less used military concept EBO (Effects-Based 
Operations).7 This paper will not deal with EBO, but rather serve as an 
alternative to it. The theoretical foundation for EBO was so hollow yet 
so widely discussed that it is better to leave that debate open and con-
centrate on developing our theoretical thinking on military operations 
instead.8 But the EBO debate can serve as an example that there was 
4 Killcullen (2006, 2009, 2010), Nagl (2005).
5 Forbidding even low-level Baath party members’ state employment, disbanding the 
whole Iraqi army without compensation and not recognising Islam as a political force was 
an almost perfect recipe for disaster.
6 Cordesman (2004, pp. 40, 44, 51).
7 Mattis (2008).
8 When the term EBO was in fashion there was a wide range of interpretations. Ho 
(2005, pp. 64).
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and actually still is need for theory regarding military operations. A num-
ber of the articles written attempted to capture the essence of the new 
term, which at the time was afforded a certain currency, with the aim 
of loading the term with old rehashed material so that more resources 
could be obtained for projects initiated earlier.9 An approach that reso-
nates with the content of this paper is offered by the researchers Michael 
Callan and Michael Ryan: “Effects-Based Operations are the application 
of military and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired 
strategic and operational outcomes in peace, tension, conflict and post-
conflict situations”. The later application of the term maintained a rela-
tively general level, which was appropriate since the approach required 
a high degree of generalisation. The definition is also good because it 
can be applied to the border area between the use of force and more 
peaceful means, as described in the above text. The fact is that the defini-
tion works very well from a field theory perspective underlines the rel-
evance of the field theory approach. The focus below is on those aspects 
of the JFCOM (United States Joint Forces Command) interpretation 
that stress the winning of peace.10 The aspects of both interpretations 
that focus on weapons effects are not relevant for the purposes of this 
paper.11 The theory presented in this text offers a practical approach that 
can be applied in situations where conventional warfare and its concepts 
are not appropriate. The issue is scientifically relevant, much research, for 
example, having been conducted into examining terms such as the now 
dearly departed EBO or the current strategic communication approach. 
This particular term is one for which researchers and other writers have 
created a number of definitions, the problem having been very much 
one of mastering the terminology. This resulted in a series of straggling 
10 (Wikström 2005, p. 12).
11 The theoretical writings on this topic are somewhat undeveloped and hackneyed. See, 
for example David A. Deptula’s paper Effects-Based Operations. Without going into detail 
it focuses on what action one can take against an enemy that is incapable of defending 
himself. The study also gives an insight into the competition that takes place between the 
armed services in the USA.
9 See, for example Dawen (2005, p. 81) and Herndon et al. (2005). Stockholm.
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definitions, simply because the term EBO was formulated without 
any normative content. One often has an idea of what one would like 
to achieve on a particular operation, but there has been no theoretical 
framework to enable a link to the problem at issue. One approach is to 
create specific theoretical terms to facilitate analysis of military opera-
tions. However, it might also be of value to do what is often done in aca-
demic circles, to apply a fresh, untested line of thinking to the material 
under study. This is the approach that will be adopted in this text, albeit 
only purely tentatively. This shows that it is far from impossible for terms 
to be given value without even the definitions of the term itself being 
defined, it is like a casino where the stakes are being thought over and 
the winner defines the content of what was at stake. A more reasonable 
approach is, of course, to define what is being discussed before proceed-
ing with a power struggle over the same subject of discussion.
A theoretical perspective will now be presented that gives an alterna-
tive perspective to military planning, or it will at least provide an under-
standing of how an operations area can be analysed using theory. It is 
worth stressing that this does not necessarily mean presenting a theory 
that will lead to new practices on the field. Rather it so happens that 
much of what is advocated by the theory actually already occurs on the 
field. The problem is that the practices being examined here have hith-
erto lacked any form of explanatory foundation, other than that proven 
experience has shown that they work well. If the practices are given a 
theoretical explanation this may illuminate how current practice can 
be further developed. Therein lies the benefit of a theory that can be 
applied to the practices under discussion here.
I emphasise this point here, but believe it to be so important that you 
will find it repeated throughout the text: theories are used mainly to gen-
erate issues of interest that will be played out empirically. Theories are not 
primarily used to provide answers to questions. If the latter were the case 
empirical research would not be necessary, theory alone would suffice 
to explain reality. This is an unempirical process that should be avoided. 
Only in exceptional cases where there is a lack of empirical foundation 
can one generalise using an empirical approach, and assume that a situ-
ation will play out in a certain way. Nonetheless, theory is important in 
empirical research, as it helps us structure the reality which empirical data 
consists of.
Military intervention in an area where armed conflict is taking place is, 
to say the least, a risky undertaking. There is a mass of information that 
10  H. GUNNERIUSSON
decision makers can and must gather and analyse in order to find answers 
to important questions. In addition, there is a wealth of information that 
cannot be acquired beforehand. Once a military force has intervened in 
a crisis area the conditions will change and new structural patterns may 
emerge. However, it is of great help if one has a theoretical model in 
advance that can be applied to the local arena, especially if the same pic-
ture is shared by everyone in your organisation. This essay introduces 
such an approach and aims to show the value of field theory. Military 
operations will always be conducted in line with a specific operational 
practice that will often have been well tested. Why does this practice 
take this particular form? A simple answer is because it has been shown 
to work. But why does it work? What are the underlying structures on 
which that practice is based?
The method in this text has a disadvantage in a quickly evolving sce-
nario if the theoretical approach is to be used in a quickly unfolding 
ongoing conflict, by, for example, military units. The method here in is 
the one which one rather uses after the conflict, in order to try to recon-
struct the events. Or it can be used in a prolonged conflict where there is 
time for analyses as events unfold. One can classify the method as a quali-
tative analysis based on primary and secondary sources.
The method chosen, however, is to show through the use of a num-
ber of examples how sociological theory can be applied in general to 
military planning. In particular, the so-called field theory is put forwards 
as the example, a theory hatched by Pierre Bourdieu. This theory, after 
examination, will then be applied to the scenario of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. The methods used in a real context depend primarily on 
what kind of source materials there are. The theory is not dependent on 
any specific type of method, so one can use whatever one thinks works 
best, qualitative as well as quantitative material. This and the following 
text present a theory that will be transformed into practice; it is both a 
generalisation of reality and a road map for practice in the same reality. 
The preferred method for a contemporary ongoing conflict would in this 
case be quantitative correspondence analysis often called MCA, and it is 
a statistical method. For those interested in this method one can look at 
the course material for a wide range of courses teaching this method.12 
12 Recommended software for performing the method can be found here: http://www.
spadsoft.com/ [Visited 170509].
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The method is best explained in the book Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis by Birgitte le Roux and Henry Rouanet.13 This method makes 
use of a large host of different data, of which you do not know the real 
importance at the start of the case—it is a tabula rasa, to get the value 
of the data mapped during the research. You can, for example, use 50 
different questions just about religion, they can be keywords, or physical 
objects like buildings, or religious practices. One can suspect that some 
of them have importance and some do not, but confronted with the 
actors on the field one might get some surprising results which let you 
understand the field as a whole together with all the other parameters 
(perhaps thousands) you confront the reality with. You get a pattern, a 
system of beliefs which constitute the field with this method.
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Abstract  In this chapter, the theoretical framework of field theory is 
presented. The freedom of framing the field depending on the task is dis-
cussed along with terms as capital, autonomous vs. heteronomous and 
illusio. An example of a social field of the discipline of history of war is 
also presented.
Keywords  Field theory · Capital · Illusio
Field theory as mentioned above can be used to describe a practice by 
the military, a practice that very often can be quite innovative. Field 
theory has originally nothing to do with the field in the military sense. 
However, what field theory is able to provide is a theoretical and com-
prehensive explanation of the logic of practice in the area of operations, 
which has hitherto been lacking. Consequently, old practice can be 
placed in a new context and given relevance in situations that have not 
been previously addressed; new systems become available suggesting a 
range of different modi operandi.
One can compare the relation between practice and theory to the 
ever-current scientific theoretical discussions on the relationship between 
technology and science, which seem to follow one after the other. There 
is no given answer, but the question becomes of interest when it gener-
ates scientific problems. It is often the case that technology precedes sci-
ence, the purpose of science after all being to explain the overall context 
CHAPTER 2
Field Theory
© The Author(s) 2017 
H. Gunneriusson, Bordieuan Field Theory as an Instrument 
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of the results of practical technology. Field theory can fulfil the same 
function in the military arena. Adopting this approach with the explana-
tory perspective of theory guiding the way, the theory enables field oper-
ators to take things forward in a normative fashion.1
Field theory has proved to be a successful tool in a multitude of stud-
ies over decades, focusing on cultural factors. Questions such as which 
factors are or are not important for a particular group of actors are typi-
cally those that field theory can be used to answer. The answers are of 
great importance because for one’s own operations, it will be essential to 
understand the operational theatre in general and the opposing parties 
in particular. Armed conflict is a battle of wills. To hold firmly to one’s 
course in the face of opposition may of course lead to subjugating your 
enemy, but to win the peace requires more than just subjugation. You 
need to influence the opposition’s perception of what is important and 
not.
Field theory is probably most appropriate for prolonged low-intensity 
conflicts. This, however, is an empirical question, but it is probably more 
productive to use field theory and methods other than military ones to 
try to understand and influence the opposing party when the conflict is 
still in the peace promotion phase. There is apparently no lack of defi-
nitions associated with low-intensity conflict, quite the reverse.2 Low-
intensity conflict presents an arena in which field theory could enable a 
smoother achievement of designated aims. That said, I now intend to 
avoid discussion on the definition of low-intensity and other conflicts. 
The not unusual prolonged length of low-intensity conflict makes field 
theory a viable option for analysis as it takes time to gather and process 
data in a heuristic process.
The issue of definitions is principally of academic interest. For those 
interested in achieving a successful outcome in the operational theatre, 
it is better to start from the other end: conduct an empirical study of the 
conflict, determine what needs to be achieved and thereafter decide if 
intervention is necessary and if so, what kind, e.g. conventional warfare 
or more peace-oriented operations. In other words, one has to decide 
whether the armed forces in question will go in with the most advanced 
1 For a discussion on normative and descriptive theory in military theory, see, for exam-
ple, Ångström (2003, p. 154).
2 Ångström (2003).
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weapon systems at their disposal, e.g. tanks, electronic warfare units, 
cyberwar, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, air defence systems, heavy artil-
lery, or if just boots on the ground will suffice. Once that decision has 
been made the definition will follow in line with the course of action 
chosen.3 Defining the level of conflict has no intrinsic value; it is the 
operational effect that is the crucial factor.
Field theory does not provide a means of bending the enemy to one’s 
will, rather of getting the opposing party to voluntarily change strategy 
to one better aligned to one’s own aim for the operation. The deterrent 
effect achieved by a show of armed force is certainly one component of 
the theory, but it is not the most important factor. In his book, Arms and 
Influence, Thomas Schelling developed the concept of the deterrent effect 
associated with an armed force capability.4 Schelling is no longer alone in 
this field, with a complete genre of literature on the topic of diplomacy 
backed by the threat of armed force now in existence.5 The Nobel laureate 
Schelling is, however, a prominent portal figure in this field of research.
Possessing the potential for armed force has a deterrent effect and is 
certainly an important factor, but securing the monopoly of armed force 
is only a minimum requirement not an optimum criterion.6 If field the-
ory is to be linked to military thinking, then Sun Tzu is the one who 
best captures the essence of the theory.7 He believed that a strategy that 
delivers victory without the need for battle is the supreme strategy that 
will win all and many battles. This is also the heart of field theory, with 
the focus not on defeating the enemy. Neither is field theory a question 
of forcing the enemy to choose his next best strategy, or even a worse 
strategy. Field theory is about changing the conditions for all actors in 
the operational area to ensure that the strategies that do not involve the 
use of force are those that will most easily lead to the achievement of the 
goals established by the actors.
3 One might consider that a misjudgement was made by the Armed Forces, and if so then 
a redefinition is obviously required.
4 Schelling (1996). The reasoning in Chap. 5 is particularly inspiring in this context.
5 See, for example, Alexander L. George’s excellent paper The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy, which places considerable emphasis on measures to encourage change and not 
just on threats to use armed force. The book also presents several examples of research into 
this genre.
6 Weber (1989, p. 64).
7 Sun Tzu (1997, p. 25).
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The differences between Schelling’s line of argument and the above 
are many, but they can be summarised in simple terms. Schelling wants 
to coerce the opposition to choose an alternative other than his preferred 
alternative. Field theory in this application centres on changing the struc-
ture of the social arena so that the opposition’s preferred strategy is one 
we find acceptable and can therefore allow them to adopt. However, the 
most important thing is that the opposing party is encouraged to pur-
sue the new strategy, to abandon the previous practice by changing the 
logic of the field. The focus for operations is thus to change the political 
conditions, using both the whip and the carrot, and is primarily not con-
cerned with the duel between the actor in question and one’s own camp. 
The dangers of focusing on one of the actors and not the whole arena 
are at least twofold:
(1)  There will always be a large number of actors, and by focusing 
on their environment (both the political and the physical), one 
will be able to influence them all. If one chooses to concentrate 
one’s focus solely on one or a handful of actors, the others will 
get away, and one will not therefore be able to take a comprehen-
sive overview of the situation.
(2)  The other problem with focusing on individual actors is that this 
approach will result in the ultimate goal being viewed through a 
different lens from that which would have been used if one had 
focused on the arena as a whole. This is a problem which can lead 
to the wrong decisions being taken, because the essentials and the 
non-essentials have not been kept separate. There are problems 
and, of course, opportunities to explore, but the text is mainly 
tutorial in its character.
Should one therefore, in line with the above argument, completely 
ignore the opposition? No, it is a question of which priorities to adopt, 
the arena as a whole taking priority over individual actors. The indi-
vidual actors must, however, be allowed to change their strategy. If this 
approach is to succeed, a detailed qualitative knowledge of the actors and 
their agendas must be accumulated. What are the actors’ agendas? To 
which alternative strategies should they be allowed to change? Can a col-
lective actor be allowed to spread strategy over a more acceptable range 
of agendas? The main aim, however, is to change the local conditions in 
2 FIELD THEORY  17
the operations area, to create a situation where the local actors, of their 
own volition, change to a strategy more aligned to one’s own aims.
An operations’ area may be described as a cultural field, which in 
its turn is a mutating social space. The theory itself embraces a bat-
tery of terms and ideas which are interesting from a meta-perspective. 
However, for the present, we do not need the entire complex of field 
theory to create a theoretical platform for understanding warfare. 
Inspiration has of course been drawn from existing theory when called 
for. Culture in this context does not refer to what in everyday lan-
guage we would call highbrow culture; it has instead a broader meaning. 
Culture encompasses human activity, specifically in this case human rela-
tionships, formal or informal. The term field can best be described as a 
social arena with its own unwritten rules, where the rules set the stand-
ards for people’s behaviour. These rules are by Bourdieu called illusio. 
The social arena, and perhaps also the geographic arena, comprises only 
part of the domain covered by an area of operations. The field can also 
include the current political activity in the area, which is the focus of the 
following text. The basic values of the active actors (specific individuals, 
groups or organisations) on the field will determine the future shape of 
the field. A field may be defined as broadly as the Balkans’ political field, 
or as narrowly as the Mostar political field, or even more narrowly if the 
task in hand requires it. The business of deciding what you choose to 
call a field is governed entirely by the issues and the tasks you are faced 
with. The term field is a theoretical construction based on empirical fact. 
A field is defined by the gains that one stands to make therein. What are 
the field’s specific values, the stakes involved and the boundaries? The 
answers to these questions are best provided by those who, during the 
course of their lives, have lived and worked in that particular field. A 
field is defined by its characteristics and laws. Each cultural field has its 
own rules, illusio, which in turn defines what will be regarded as capital. 
If one understands the characteristics of a field, then one can form a pic-
ture of it, as well as of the agendas of the actors involved and the merits 
of each position held.8 Actors are also structured on an individual level, 
not only on a field level by their illusion. All the experiences of impor-
tance (that is subjective of course) an individual has will shape them so 
8 Bourdieu (1992, p. 41).
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that their future decisions will be decided by their past experiences along 
with the nature of the situation. Pierre Bourdieu believes that people 
have the freedom to act within the frame set by their collective experi-
ence. He calls that habitus. This is a crucial key for an intervention force 
that intends to influence the very structure of the field in a controlled 
way. The field will be affected in any case by an intervention, but as a 
military force, you really want it to happen in a way you can predict 
(Fig. 2.1).
To be a respected actor in a field, one must understand and accept 
the field’s rules. The unwritten rules of the field are an important part 
of how the field is defined, which means that the field will take a dif-
ferent form if new rules begin to apply. If new rules are introduced, 
Fig. 2.1 A visualisation of how habitus can structure the actor, but also leave 
freedom of choice within a space of actions.  The percentage distribution is 
purely hypothetical. Not many viable options remain when matching our habitus 
with what is considered acceptable from the local perspective. It is fully possi-
ble to act within the limitations set by the local field; the problem is that such 
actions do not work very well; 360 degrees represent the theoretical full span of 
actions a human can perform in a given situation. In the end, a sector is open 
for the actor to act comfortably within, the width depending on habitus and the 
situation.
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earlier actors may find their positions threatened. Thus, an interna-
tional force that is clearly out of touch with the local rules of the field 
can be perceived as threatening, regardless of the tactics they decide to 
adopt. There is nothing that says that the rules that apply today will do 
so tomorrow. This applies most especially to the right to exercise force, 
which will certainly be restricted for local actors. However, showing a 
lack of understanding of the field rules will also alienate other groups, 
who may potentially feel their power base threatened by an unaware 
newcomer on the field. This poses a constant problem for actors who 
wish to establish themselves in a social field, for example, in the case of 
international civilian as well as military intervention (Fig. 2.2).
The many actors in a field also have their own agendas. What holds 
them all together is that they all believe that the game is worth playing. 
They all adhere to what the field represents and that in turn keeps them 
as actors on the field. Thus, there are similarities between the actors, but 
also differences. The actors on the left side lie in the autonomous area of 
the field. In this area, activities are conducted based on the premise that 
Activitics conducted


















loyal to field rules, often
junior actors (ambitious)
Fig. 2.2 A basic sketch of how the four fields of a social field are usually 
constructed
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the activities themselves have value. On the right-side activities are con-
ducted motivated by other reasons than the rules dictated by the specific 
social field. The right side shows the heteronomous area of the field, the 
dependent area, that is: dependent on other social fields. An illustration 
may be taken from the field of art, where in the autonomous area, art 
would be practised for art’s sake, whereas in the heteronomous area, art 
would primarily be produced to make, for example, money to take the 
most occurring example. In many cases, the former art is the one which 
eventually yields the most money. But the latter category of art can often 
be mass-produced and really have no ambition to be recognised as art in 
the first place.
However, it is often the case that someone playing the game on the 
field has not always made a clear, conscious decision to take part. This 
is not illogical since the actors see their lives set in a complex reality 
and not as a game on an abstract field. An individual, as a result of his 
background and current situation, may be inclined to take certain deci-
sions. These, viewed from the theoretical perspective, are seen as the 
consequences of the field’s structure and the personal dispositions of the 
actors. The person in question probably does not see it as taking a deci-
sion; he just sees it as the right thing to do.
An example of a field is the academic historical field, the cultural 
field for the production of history.9 The historical field exists because a 
great many of the actors value and are interested in “history”. By his-
tory, one means its creation in media form, which in some ways could 
be said to be presenting a testimony to the past. The actors will often 
have differing opinions on what is considered a faithful and relevant rep-
resentation of history. As already stated, what they have in common is 
that they have each decided to remain in the arena. A dislike of some-
one else’s presentation of history is a constituent part of the field’s activ-
ity, as is to the same degree sympathy with the ideas of others. All of 
them believe that they are fighting for something important when they 
directly or indirectly assert their opinions on what they consider to be a 
9 The historical field here refers to the field where history is produced, not where it is 
absorbed—certain rules and logic apply here. A clear example may be the phenomenon 
whereby literary critics very often do not favour books that are bestsellers.
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faithful rendering of history. For the sake of clarity, a field is presented 
below showing a selection of what might be included in a historical field 
(Fig. 2.3).10
As the diagram above indicates the field is made up of a disparate col-
lection of actors and activities. Here, it functions more like a mind map 
than an actual positioning based on quantitative data. Holocaust deniers 
and history professors after all have little in common. But nevertheless, 
as is shown here, they are all players in the historical field. This shows 
that the game is one worth playing, although they will each have their 
own definition of “good” and “bad” history. In this way, they are all part 
of a whole, the professor probably regarding the falsifier as an out-and-
out liar and the history falsifier seeing the professor as someone who has 
been bought by the establishment.
Even within each of the quadrants, there is considerable breadth. In 
the top-right quadrant, one would find authors concentrating on military 




















Fig. 2.3    An example of a historical field
10 For more discussion on the historical field: Gunneriusson (2002a, b). For a 
more detailed study of the anatomy of a field, Bourdieu (1996a), especially, p. 121, is 
recommended.
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They both are widely read, even though van Creveld devotes himself 
more to analysis (left side of quadrant) than Keegan, who concentrates 
more on opinions (right side of quadrant). This leaves them both placed 
high in the field but with Keegan tending more towards the right because 
of his non-scientific background. It is not only the range of journalistic 
ability that constitutes the field. The establishment of reputations on the 
field is in fact an empirical issue. Respected war historians, such as Charles 
Edward White, David Glantz and James S. Corum, are not as widely read 
as the two authors named above, but their exalted academic standing as 
professors of military history means that their opinions carry considerable 
weight. They would without hesitation be placed high up on the left side 
of the field, mainly because of their formal positions as professors. That 
position serves as a form of acknowledgement, but even a professor can 
squander his capital. A once-respected war historian who is widely read 
is David Irving. When over the course of time, it became known that his 
presentation of history had a political stamp which was in conflict with 
striving towards objectivity, respect for him declined.11 From having held 
a position very similar to Keegan, he is now grouped together with holo-
caust deniers such as the French literature Professor Robert Faurisson.
The most distinguished professors are placed in the upper-left quad-
rant of the field, quite irrespective of what these individuals think of 
each other. Hypothetically speaking, Corum, Glantz and White may 
disapprove of each other for both personal and professional reasons—
just because one’s research is sound does not mean that other reli-
able researchers will agree with the conclusions presented. They have, 
however, built their positions on the same foundation, by conduct-
ing research into military history for its own sake and acquiring such 
esteemed reputations (symbolic capital)  that their word almost amounts 
to law. Both strive for objectivity, even though there will always exist a 
certain degree of subjectivity in every position presented. If the most-
respected cultural royalty of the upper-left quadrant identifies a phe-
nomenon on the field, then their definition of that phenomenon will be 
accepted. They have the power, at least partially, to influence field defini-
tions to a disproportionately strong degree merely by voicing their opin-
ions. Conflict between individuals in any given sector can be fierce; they 
do not need to agree with each other because their positions lie close, 
11 Guttenplan (2005).
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but they have achieved the regard in which they are held on the field 
because they have each accumulated symbolic capital of equal value.
Capital is a word that implies a resource that actors have at their dis-
posal. Those who possess this resource have power. The term can be 
divided into two main categories: symbolic capital and social capital. 
Social capital may comprise good personal contacts and social networks. 
For the purposes of this study, the symbolic form of capital is of greater 
interest. It can be defined as “that which social groups recognise as of 
value and to which they ascribe value”.12 The term symbolic capital can 
be seen as a collective expression for prestige, a good reputation, respect 
and authority. How an individual acquires a good reputation within a 
particular sphere, profession or in the workplace, is not entirely clear. 
Many forms of capital are specific to their fields to such an extent that 
the capital will be afforded little or no acclaim outside the circles that 
constitute that particular field. Within the subcultures of young people, 
there are many examples of this. To be able to do a trick with, for exam-
ple, a skateboard can be the key to the respect of your friends. The same 
trick will hardly be worth much in the job market or as an aid to gaining 
better grades at school. The military world is another section of society 
that has a wide range of capital that can hardly be said to hold much 
worth in society as a whole. To have or have held a particular appoint-
ment is something that is met with a special respect among military per-
sonnel but the value of which other people will find hard to understand. 
The same applies to having served abroad on a particular mission or hav-
ing studied at a foreign military college of good repute.
The value of symbolic capital is therefore decided by how it is recognised 
by those who form the immediate environment on the social field. In this 
respect, a degree of relativity thus permeates the whole field. The major-
ity of the field therefore acknowledges certain types of capital as prestigious 
and therefore valuable, and the individual actor can extract advantage from 
his capital if it registers on the scale of values applied by the field. For exam-
ple, resort to the use of violence is not considered a legitimate option if 
other political alternatives are available. This will apply if the field is consti-
tuted in a similar way to a Western domestic political field. This can, how-
ever, change if leading actors on the field advocate other types of capital, for 
example the capacity for violence. There may also be forms of capital on the 
12 Broady (1989, p. 169).
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field to which all actors do not have access. This may involve types of pres-
tige and reputation that are not compatible: to act as a representative for 
different religious groups at one and the same time is seldom possible. Even 
if all forms of capital are theoretically not available to all actors, there is 
merit in undermining these inaccessible positions, since power on the field 
is relative to the other actors participating. For example, it may be difficult 
to acquire respect as a self-assumed guardian of mosques in Hercegovina 
if one is at the same time a recognised Croatian militia leader (a position 
which itself has symbolic value). For this particular militia leader, a whole 
host of positions will be unavailable because of the illusio of the field. It 
may therefore seem a reasonable and rational strategy to undermine your 
opponents’ position as guardians by attacking mosque buildings, despite 
the fact that the underlying driving force in the conflict may not necessar-
ily be ethnic or religious. Attacks on religious buildings are in this instance 
only a consequence of the structure of the field. By regarding the destruc-
tion of religious buildings in this light, this action acquires logic distant 
from the havoc of ethnic cleansing.
The accumulation of capital is a principal activity on the field. 
However, the conflict on the social field also has another level: the actual 
definition of what is to be regarded as legitimate capital, and therefore, 
ultimately, the definition of the field itself is also an object of conten-
tion within the conflict: the definition of the field is always in conten-
tion and is an important point to appreciate.13 A basic example might 
involve deciding to what degree physical violence has legitimacy as a 
political means on the field at a given time. All sections of the interven-
tion force, military as well as others, will work towards the same goal, a 
comprehensive approach, which in this case can be defining the use of 
violence as an inappropriate strategy as a means of achieving or exercising 
political power. A militarily strong minority section of the population will 
see obvious disadvantages in the democratisation of their society, since 
their percentage part of the population does not equate to their military 
strength. Representatives of such a group may choose a delaying strategy 
against the development of democracy, in order to convert their military 
power base into a form of capital more marketable in the future. Actors, 
who choose not to forego violence as a political means, will find that 
their power will stagnate as the use of violence is limited by intervention 
13 Bourdieu (1996b, p. 44).
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force operations. At the same time, all the groups who have rejected vio-
lence will receive strong backing from the resources that can be gener-
ated by both the military force and organisations cooperating with them. 
In this situation, soundings will be conducted and proposals to forego 
violence made to the groups that persist with a violent strategy.
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Abstract  This chapter deals with one possible implementation of 
field theory in a generic operational area. The main challenge is to 
operationalise the concept of field-specific capital in order to classify and 
affect the adversary and other actors on the field.
Keywords  Operationalisation · Field specific · Actors
The classic Western definition of war reads: “the continuation of politics 
by other means”.1 This definition should be kept in mind when dealing 
with the armed groups in the area, as well as the civilian political struc-
ture, regardless of the form or level of violence prevalent on the field at 
the time. If the local field rules and recognised forms of capital can be 
identified, then the chances of being able to make effective decisions will 
increase dramatically.
For example, patterns of behaviour can be monitored to predict 
future activity at a strategic level and below. These predictions gain fur-
ther credence when the intervention forces actively use their knowledge 
to bring about structural change to the logic being applied in the opera-
tions area; it is not just a question of observing. It is pertinent here to 
1 von Clausewitz (1991, p. 42).
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remember that this is an empirical science. The theoretical framework 
given presents a method of reflecting on and an approach to the mis-
sion in hand. What in reality actually applies and has import on the field 
is beyond the scope of this theory; the theory must be developed heu-
ristically. This can be achieved by conducting various types of InfOps 
(Information Operations), such as HUMINT (Human Intelligence). 
Strategies on the field are all a type of reproduction strategy, the essen-
tial being to maintain or improve one’s own or the group’s position on 
the field. In short, it is a question of power. Conversion strategies aimed 
at changing one form of capital to another, which in a given situation 
appears more advantageous, are one example.
In an area plagued by unrest, the political field may be likened to a 
piece of sloping ground where actors believe that they must use violence 
to have any influence, thereby foregoing more civilised political methods. 
In general terms, one can say that the ultimate goal in the struggle on 
the field is dominance. Dominance is achieved by the actors who have 
acquired a considerable amount of the current marketable symbolic capi-
tal on the field (e.g. capacity for violence, ability to call mass meetings 
and religious legitimacy), often manifested by occupying important posi-
tions (e.g. as leader of a particular group or organisation). The shape of 
the field will reflect the values of the dominant group or groups. A field 
presupposes a conflict, which then defines the arena. All actors believe 
the political game to be worth playing. This is a prerequisite to qualify 
as an actor, but the actors hold different viewpoints and apply different 
methods. The presence of a number of institutions that can dispense 
awards within the field raises the stakes for conflict on the field. These 
may be state institutions, but they may also be informal institutions such 
as various groupings (military, ethnic, religious, geographic, etc.).
The international force will have as a goal the establishment of a 
monopoly of the use of force in the operations area. This will mean that 
several of the actors on the field will have their positions threatened. 
To merely meet these actors with force will compel them to go under-
ground, which is not a step towards a desired end state. The desired 
effect in the local political field of the operations area is that all politi-
cal activity is conducted within the framework defined by the politico-
strategic goals of which the intervention force is a product. Groups 
which have an ulterior political agenda, beyond violence, will be inclined 
to reappraise their strategies if the alternative is marginalisation, or the 
threat of their organisation ceasing to exist. Marginalisation in this sense 
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is primarily political, but social or economical marginalisation can be 
critical vulnerabilities to weaken their political capital. This inclination is 
one of the two crucial factors which make it important to influence these 
actors who can choose in particular. The other important factor is that 
actors with a political agenda find it easy to assert legitimacy for their 
actions, in contrast to the bandit gangs and warlords with limited politi-
cal aims and little choice other than marginalisation (Fig. 3.1).
Different types of groupings can offer various types of reward, both 
formal and informal. For example, money or a promise of a position in 
the present or future government hierarchy may be offered. However, 
some driving forces may be less easily identifiable. As a rule, driving 
forces are harder to identify if they involve cultural phenomena that are 
not easily recognisable within one’s own political culture. It is in these 
obscure peculiarities that there lies a potential source of great error with 
regard to one’s choice of course of action in the operations area. Power 
in one form or another is what is respected on the field, even if that 
power is of an indirect nature. The specific initial empirical question in 
any study is: What constitutes power in this situation?
Each field has its own specific characteristics, even if all fields have 
certain common basic structures that enable field theory to be applied 












Little amount of capital
(power)
Area of field 
monopolised by
intervention force
Fig. 3.1 A field sketch used as a mind map. Actors on the right side of the field 
will, by the use of both the carrot and the stick, be made to change their strate-
gies to ones more akin to those on the left side of the field
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in different areas.2 For example, the French intellectual field cannot be 
studied without recognising the importance afforded to a few so-called 
elite schools throughout the country. A country such as the former 
Yugoslavia had the particular characteristic that the distinctive quality 
of each of the regions was much more pronounced than in many other 
countries, which was then reflected in the political field. A picture of the 
field can be gained by studying how actors and institutions interact with 
each other. The relative conditions guided the actors’ strategies, which in 
turn served to preserve or alter the strength of the field’s various forms 
of power.3 The power of the individual actor on the field is relative to the 
remainder of the field, which means that a stronger position is attained 
if the capital of one’s opponent is devalued, and his power thus reduced.
The model of thought is simple in itself, but it is important to do 
more than just understand it. It should be seen as an approach or link 
to reality that quickly enables one to organise and structure the actors in 
an operations area. As a result, the model offers a guide to the courses 
of action open and to what may be appropriate in any given situation. 
Acting in accordance with field theory at the operational level requires 
one to focus on three main tasks, of which one can be considered the 
one that distinguishes the method of attack from other more conven-
tional alternatives.
a tentative checkList
Initially one can say that the checklist should be seen as focused on struc-
tural change first. This will give collateral effects on the actors which are 
directly affected by the structural change and secondary effects on the 
actors, who are not directly involved in the practice being targeted, but 
still are a part of the social field and takes notes on what happens on it.
1. Secure a monopoly on armed force
This is the minimum and basic demand placed on the intervention 
force. If the politico-strategic goals are reasonably modest, then the 
area of operations may be limited to an area smaller than the whole con-
flict arena. Bosnia provides a good example, when for a long time the 
2 For several examples of field studies, see Broady (1998).
3 Bourdieu (1996, p. 159).
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Bosnian Serbs were allowed to control their own areas because there 
were insufficient resources to contain their capacity for violence.
2a. Establish an understanding of the logic of practice in the opera-
tions area
This is the structural approach, which deals with making out what is 
considered of value on this social field, what is generating capital, both 
symbolic and economical capital, perhaps even social capital.
2b. Establish the agendas of key actors
This applies in particular to those who perpetrate violence: Which of 
them have political goals which can be achieved by means other than vio-
lence? Those that have this type of goal are potentially able to change 
their approach to a political agenda without violence. In addition, those 
actors who have a political agenda but who do not use violent means 
must be identified. All of these actors must be accessible for dialogue and 
qualitative intelligence work.
3. Work on what are considered the critical points of the logic of 
practice
This is most likely a heuristic process, where the targets and goals change 
during the process as new learnings most likely will submerge the more you 
deal with the social field of the operational field. One example of what one 
can target is the way religion is used as a means of mobilisation of vio-
lence. Another example can be the informal economy of the social field, 
how to tweak it to get the actors into perceiving other (more benevo-
lent) strategies as “the best” strategies, or at least better than the strat-
egies their own forces regard as unwanted. Furthermore, the symbolic 
capital of social, geographical or ethnic groups, even gender, can be can 
be targeted—strengthening or weakening their positions in order to 
achieve certain effects on the way the social field is constituted.
4a. Offer actors using violent tactics the opportunity to change 
strategy
Once an acceptable monopoly on armed force has been established 
and has been in operation for a while, negotiations with the actors 
should begin. In short, resources are offered to allow participation in the 
political process, but using peaceful means. The choice of resources will 
vary and will be guided by the actors’ needs, and may involve both mate-
rial and services. Reconstruction is thus not something that takes place 
after the conflict. Reconstruction of whatever is involved provides a route 
to gaining control over the area of operations; it is not something that 
happens through the process of establishing control. The military force 
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must therefore direct the process of reconstruction in the area, partly 
because it is an integral part of their operational plan as discussed here, 
and partly because it would be a dangerous undertaking for NGOs to 
operate without the protection of the military force.
4b. Offer resources to political actors not using violent tactics
There should be a carrot for political actors with an existing peace-
ful agenda. It is, however, just as important to have a stick ready for the 
actors using violent methods who refuse to change their strategy. They 
will see their political influence wane at the same time that the political 
party apparatus of politicians using peaceful means and its ability to reach 
out will grow, and that the military force continues to hinder the agenda 
of violent political elements. The offer at (3a) remains open for those 
who wish to take it up. It is a question of showing which practices will 
lead to increased power, violence probably having been the most advan-
tageous prior to the military force initiating their operational plan.
It is important at this point to stress that those who receive politi-
cal help are at liberty to disagree with the politics pursued by the coun-
tries represented within the military force. Under no circumstances 
should it appear that those receiving help have been bought up by a 
foreign power. Their symbolic capital should not be undermined, which 
will be the case if those receiving support are perceived as nothing but 
puppets of the contributing nations of the military force. The ideal situ-
ation would be to have the military force supporting a group compris-
ing different collective actors covering a wide political spectrum. These 
actors would then become the foundation for the remodelled political 
field. Through the strengthening of these actors, the political field will 
be redefined, leading to the actors inclined to violence being marginal-
ised. In the end, if these actors do not change strategy, they will be per-
ceived—not only by the international force but also more importantly 
by the population—as terrorist organisations opposing the civil political 
system.
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Abstract  This chapter touches on concepts of information warfare, for 
example COIN-theory. Field theory as information warfare is the main 
topic. The purpose is to frame the field theory as a valid example of both 
method and theory regarding information warfare. This is especially 
important as a lot of the practice regarding information warfare is not 
anchored in a social theory but mostly in a best practice way of acting. 
That is all well but a theory provides a wider range of generalising and 
thus options of free-thinking.
Keywords  Information warfare · COIN · Field theory
InfOps are mainly associated with guarding access to one’s own infor-
mation, but InfOps are also concerned with controlling the opposition’s 
access to information.1 It is essentially the process of disinformation or 
denying information. The term InfOps is comparatively wide rang-
ing and can involve operations that are not necessarily conducted dur-
ing times of crisis or war. Information warfare is conducted with the aim 
of influencing an area suffering from war, crisis or other violent circum-
stances. Can the application of field theory therefore be said to constitute 
information operations? It must be admitted that it is an unorthodox 
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1 Dictionary of Military Terms (1999), London.
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form of warfare. The answer is affirmative, with the finesse that the 
enemy does not need to be completely identified but just by his methods 
and goals. The aim is to attack a critical vulnerability of the enemy by 
altering the social, political and economic reference system. In a para-
phrase of a famous saying by Mao, one might say that it is a question of 
changing the water in which the fish are swimming. The critical vulner-
ability of the enemy is his political legitimacy in the mission area. The 
attack is conducted by changing the conditions of the field so that even 
unidentified political actors may also find themselves under attack. If the 
vulnerable point is attacked, the enemy’s centre of gravity will have to be 
adjusted accordingly. For this approach to be effective, the actor must 
be a genuine political actor, an actor interested in political gain. If the 
actor has no political ambitions—perhaps in the case of organised crime 
for financial gain—then there is also no reason not to countermine the 
actor’s position as a player on the field. However, it is important that 
there is a general perception that the actor is not a political actor. It is 
the judgement of the field, not that of the actor, that determines whether 
an actor is political or not.2 It is worth stressing the importance of quali-
tative knowledge of the actors on the field, in the same way that knowl-
edge of the field’s own structure is key information.
A field theoretical approach to operations should strive to give the 
enemy information of a type that is not disinformative. As it is a long 
process, it is important to not undermine the trust in the process with 
disinformation. The information presented should fit with the stated aim 
of influencing the actor to change his strategy. It involves information in 
the form of action rather than words, to clearly show the disadvantages 
of a strategy of violence by confronting him with a well-armed and well-
equipped military force. It is also important to clearly show the alternative 
strategies that are possible. The latter should be combined with making it 
obvious that the positions of non-violent actors will be greatly enhanced, 
whatever their political standpoint. In this way, it will become clear to all 
that those with a non-violent political agenda will experience a considera-
ble enhancement of their power, while the increase in power for the actors 
using violent means will be obstructed or will suffer a reverse. It is thus 
important to inform the enemy in the correct manner. As this will change 
the distribution of power on the field, one might see different and new 
2 However, the field can be influenced to form a certain opinion of a particular actor.
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avenues of action being taken which can only be determined by empirical 
observation rather than theoretical laws. One can, for example, see that 
factions try to push a more civil branch of action while still not completely 
abandoning the capacity to violence in another respect, in effect a pos-
sible case of lip service. One might also see that complicity might result in 
armed groups of a faction (whatever its constitution) might turn on what 
they perceive as collaborators. In the latter case, the capacity of violence 
by our own forces must not be dismissed as unnecessary.
Nevertheless, field theory information efforts have clear strategic 
implications, at least if by strategy one means creating an overall plan 
and materially providing sufficiently for the operational level to ensure 
that information can be communicated. It will require information and 
reconnaissance resources over and above normal levels if a field theory 
approach is to be more than just a shot in the dark. Information has 
been stated to be the key to irregular warfare, something which hardly 
can be denied.3 One can because of that clearly see the advantages of 
using a perspective as Field theory—which bases its foundation on 
information—as an operational COIN-approach.
Political activity is a manifestation of the will to acquire power through 
the accumulation of capital in the political field. By reading off the rules of 
the field, a range of measures can be instigated against various actors on 
the field to influence them to more or less voluntarily change their opera-
tional strategy. How this will be achieved is an empirical question and one 
that does not lend itself to theorising; all fields are unique and must be 
treated accordingly. It is a question partly of the interests and competence 
of the actors, and partly of the range of resources at the disposal of the 
international force. The DIME approach is one of many methods used 
to structure the various arenas used for an operation.4 This model can be 
useful in certain situations, but is far too general in most cases to be of 
interest for our purposes here. There are a number of possible measures 
of symbolic nature that actors in the political field in the operations may 
find attractive. Provided that the actors (collectively or individually) forego 
the use of violence as a political means, a range of offers can be made in 
return. These offers must be made clearly and abundantly to the actors 
3 Kalyvas (2009, p. 174), also quoting Eckstein (1965, p. 158).
4 The acronym has later expanded to DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, 
Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement). Headquarters Department of 
the Army, p. 1.
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who are already positioned on the left side of the field. They must at no 
time be seen as a reward to the actors on the right side of the field. The 
maintenance of a strategy of violence on the right side of the field must 
be met with one of force until the strategy is clearly abandoned in favour 
of one that fits on the left side of the field. Only using force is the sim-
ple coercive approach. True, it is part of the structuring of the social field, 
but more restructuring of the field must be made—open up new attractive 
avenues of action for both actors who are benevolent but also others. It is 
important that the opportunity to switch strategy is always available and is 
actively encouraged.5
Examples of incentives to change strategy:
• Positions in public administration—dependent on competence and 
interest. Make them dependent.
• Consultation with actors on legislation—in line with a stated politi-
cal agenda. Draw them in.
• Building up infrastructure—investment, priority, naming of installa-
tions (e.g. bridges, road systems and infrastructure for telecommu-
nications). Hearts and minds.
• Building and siting of schools—for example specific home areas can 
be given priority. One can discredit as well as credit with tactical 
help.
• Alternative job opportunities—guaranteed employment for former 
militia. If Maslow’s pyramid of needs is important in the case, then 
this will have effect.
The above are but a few examples of the incentives that might be offered 
to get actors to change their strategies, it is no way everything that can be 
done. It is important to read the actors and their priorities correctly; they 
maybe have no interest at all in job opportunities, but for example may 
well have an agenda for legislation. For instance, proposed legislation 
may be submitted to them for their consideration or they may even be 
5 The action taken by the USA against Iraq’s Sunni leaders may be seen as a variation 
on this theme. They can always participate and influence the political process—influence 
 developments—if they want to. The problem is that they will never acquire any real power 
when other ethnic groups make up 80% of the population. In this particular situation, the 
USA should have found alternative solutions to the problem by making the Sunni Muslims 
feel that they were part of the process.
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asked to take part in dialogue for the formulating of that legislation. For 
other groups, the most important thing may be securing an income for 
their members under safer conditions; this may be all the incentive nec-
essary. Furthermore, many projects bear symbolic values far beyond the 
practical value the project brings. “Roads ain’t roads”, as David Kilcullen 
expresses it.6 They can signal an ambition of increased presence, military 
or other, it signals long-term commitment and ambitions.
The field theory approach aims at getting the actors to adopt strate-
gies in line with the conditions that one has set for the field; they must be 
made to see that actors with non-violent strategies quickly acquire power 
and influence in society—in contrast to those who espouse violence. It 
is important to work to suppress violence and simultaneously actively 
promote the actors who support a non-violent political process. Doing 
this will tilt the power balance on the political social field in a direction 
wanted. The tools available for promoting these actors may come from 
within one’s own organisation or from other organisations. Non-profit 
organisations are also actors on the field, regardless of whether or not 
they are working alongside the military force. The problem is that inde-
pendent organisations have their own agendas different from that of the 
military force. It is also often the case that an NGO will lose respect in 
the area of operations if it works with the military force. It is often suf-
ficient for NGO representatives to merely be afraid that this will happen, 
for cooperation to worsen. This, however, is something that needs to be 
addressed from case to case as it is an entirely empirical question.
Quantitative basic facts, used for positioning the actors, can over 
time be complemented with data that may not appear to have any-
thing to do with power on the field, facts that may seem trivial. For 
example, details of choice of brand of cigarettes may be of interest. 
If it is seen that certain brands are consumed in great quantities 
or not at all by certain groups without any reasonable explanation, 
then one might have found something interesting. If a particular 
group smokes only a certain brand of cigarette this may point to 
smuggling activity which in its turn drives the informal economy.
6 Kilcullen (2009, p. 108).
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How can field theory be operationalised? How does one decide where 
actors are positioned within the field? There is a choice of the two gen-
eral methods of analysis, either qualitative or quantitative. First is some-
thing about the quantitative method. A special software application 
programme has been produced for quantitative analysis, and it is well 
known among those who make correspondence analyses. The method 
has been mentioned above and is called multiple correspondence analy-
sis (MCA). In short, the process involves gathering a large amount of 
empirical data, regardless of whether or not it initially appears useful for 
defining the actors on the field. The information may include patterns 
of behaviour, social networks, consumer habits, economy, local political 
issues, what the different parts of society are focused on, etc. The results 
of this information gathering will then be processed to provide an empir-
ical definition of the groups. Certain values or habits for the various 
actors may come to light that have not previously been noticed. Some 
information may be of the type that affords the actors prestige, respect, 
the opportunity to exercise power, access to various arenas such as the 
media, religious circles. All these factors are then processed, and an over-
all positioning of the actors within the field is then produced. An actor’s 
position on the horizontal axis will be wholly dependent on his readiness 
or otherwise to use violence.
The second method involves a qualitative approach. As a result of 
observations made, the various actors are then positioned where one 
believes they fit on the field. This method may appear less reliable, but 
fulfils its purpose. The quantitative method relies on adopting the right 
parameters; the qualitative picture is based on an overall impression 
gained by studying and interacting on the field.7 What is appropriate is 
to a high degree dependent on a qualitative consideration of the analysis 
results. The quantitative method can be used at the strategic level where 
it is easier to gain an overview, because there often is a larger amount of 
incoming data than one can deal with. At the strategic level, the analy-
sis can be used to accurately gauge which resources will be required at 
the operational level to enable successful accomplishment of the tasks 
identified by field theory analysis. The qualitative method can be used 
to advantage at the operational level, where one is better able to feel the 
7 Correspondence analysis assumes a certain familiarity with the use of software, but 
courses are available: http://www.skeptron.ilu.uu.se/broady/sec/k-kor04.htm [Visited 
170509].
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pulse of the field on the ground—it is at this level that field theory has 
most potential. In the end, the need to gather information will lead to 
a demand for certain capabilities at the tactical level, even if the analysis 
is not conducted at that level. With the quantitative method, one gets 
a numerical value, with decimals. There is no reason to believe that the 
quantitative result is more valid than a qualitative one, as there are often 
qualitative decisions behind the quantitative ones. For example, what 
should an attack constitute to generate a number in the matrix and so 
on. With the qualitative method, you get an analysis which you have to 
decide on in terms of yes/no, do/don’t. The lack of numbers might 
superficially seem a less reliable method, but it is all determined by the 
reliability of those doing the research, not the method itself. A decision 
about a yes or a no is often what you need in a given situation, no more, 
no less. Therefore, the qualitative method is sufficient as a method for 
decision-making.
Field theory sets great demands on intelligence work, but at the same 
time, it has been made easier with the advent of new technology. Field 
theory will carry with it its own genre of HUMINT.8 Something which 
is not often mentioned is that the level of training for the military has 
been improved over the last few decades. This does not only apply to 
officers, but also to soldiers who have civilian professional qualifications.9 
One has to understand that the intelligence community is far wider 
than military intelligence, and one has to use all sources for intelligence 
there are. In quantitative terms, the amount of information available has 
increased over time, to a large extent made possible by technology. It is 
important at this point to clearly differentiate between the task of merely 
identifying targets and qualitative intelligence work.10 For this reason, 
scientific methods and theories must be used to a much greater degree 
8 HUMINT can mean different things in different contexts, see Ferris (2004, pp. 59 and 
67) (Intelligence Operations).
9 Ample opportunity exists to raise the level of education for soldiers at all levels in the 
future, by integrating university education (in this case in municipal adult education). This 
author will present thoughts on this subject on another occasion.
10 Ferris (2004, p. 57). The difference between target identification and intelligence is 
indicated, but not the need to define which agencies are involved.
42  H. GUNNERIUSSON
than before—it is no longer enough to just gather all relevant informa-
tion and start off. All relevant information will amount to too much for 
it to be managed without using a feasible method and approach.11
One problem concerning method is being able to differentiate 
between actors employing violence who have a political agenda, from 
those whose use of violence serves no political purpose at all. It is impor-
tant not to ignore the requirement to address the problems posed by 
the criminal elements without political agendas, but one must quickly 
understand that they are not interested in exchanging their violent tac-
tics for mass meetings and printing presses—they are not interested in 
any peaceful political strategy. The problem is illustrated by the following 
example from Iraq in summer 2005:
The shootings became so frequent in Baghdad this summer that Horst 
[Brig. Gen. Stf. C. 3 Inf. Div.] started keeping his own count in a white 
spiral notebook he uses to record daily events. Between May and July, he 
said, he tracked at least a dozen shootings of civilians by contractors, in 
which six Iraqis were killed and three wounded. The bloodiest case came 
on May 12 in the neighborhood of New Baghdad. A contractor opened 
fire on an approaching car, which then veered into a crowd. Two days after 
the incident, American soldiers patrolling the same block were attacked 
with a roadside bomb. [- - -] Horst declined to provide the name of the 
contractors whose employees were involved in the 12 shootings he docu-
mented in the Baghdad area. But he left no doubt that he believed the 
May 12 incident, in which three people were killed, led directly to the 
attack on his soldiers that came days later on the same block. “Do you 
think that’s an insurgent action? Hell no,” Horst said. “That’s someone 
paying us back because their people got killed. And we had absolutely 
nothing to do with it.12
12 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/09/
AR2005090902136.html [Visited 170509].
11 Only recently has it been axiomatically maintained that all relevant and reliable source 
information should be used in historical research, and something which was established in 
the earlier part of the 1900s in Sweden by Professor Lauritz Weibull, who was particularly 
interested in method. He was, however, primarily interested in the Swedish Middle Ages 
where too much information was never a problem. Researchers who are interested in cur-
rent times must learn to filter information in a systematic way.
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The quote illustrates several relevant factors, one of which is that there is 
a requirement for observers on the ground to identify who is who on the 
field. It requires an almost hermeneutic method of observation, which 
in turn means that observers must have a good pre-understanding of 
whether an observation will lead to any relevant conclusions. In addition, 
the quote shows that it is not always easy to tell the difference between 
actors with a political agenda from those who merely react in trigger 
response in revenge for an incident. However, that it is difficult to dif-
ferentiate between the two does not under any circumstances mean that 
one should cease to maintain an analytical approach. Finally, the example 
shows what happens if one does not know one’s own operational aims. 
The antithesis of field theory is to internalise an approach in which one 
indiscriminately escalates the spiral of violence; achieving peace in the 
foreseeable future will be quite out of the question with the approach 
outlined above. In addition, even if the insurgents can see the differ-
ences between different Americans in this case, they might refuse to act 
correspondingly.
This mind map of a social field (do notice the characteristic 4-fields) focus 
on the right part of the field (in the oval). It focuses on those who conduct 
politics with violent methods for different reasons. Many of the groups 
there are dependent on the rules of other fields than the political one (pri-
marily the economic field).
The diagram above shows the need for a deeper identification process after 
one has identified the actors using violent tactics. The question to answer 
after initial identification is the ever relevant why. Why do they have an 
agenda that involves violence? Only after these why-questions have been 
answered will it be possible to formulate a practical, purposeful course of 
action to engage these actors—and also those who already have an accept-
able agenda. The engagement can be directly on the actors or towards 
structures on the social field which one estimates would affect these actors. 
Once again, it is more rewarding to act on changing the social field than 
aiming at certain actors directly, as it is not sure or even likely that you have 
identified all the actors you want to target. It is important to remember this, 
even if this discussion to a large extent deals with the actors. Aiming at 
the social structures will in its turn affect even actors you still don’t know 
about. In the end, it is humans and their behaviour you want to see a 
change in, but the road might have to go through structural change first.
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All actors, certainly not the collective ones, can easily be divided into 
just one of the social categories constructed (e.g. as in Fig. 4.1). One 
can imagine a group of people who had all three categories shown above 
represented organically. But as with all theory, the analyst must draw a 
good-enough line somewhere. As it might be a matter of life and death 
in this case, there is a need to communicate the perception of the actors 
to the actors, if one wants to affect their logic of practice.
Purposeful action means the military force adopts a course of action 
aimed at getting the actors to voluntarily change their strategy, involv-
ing methods beyond the purely firefighting techniques employed to pre-
vent genocide and the like. A group that has no political agenda linked 
to its use of violence is difficult to influence using methods aimed at get-
ting them to change from their current pattern of behaviour to acting 
violence as political
means; the primary target
group for change of
strategy.If they change
their strategy this will
have a positive effect
across the whole structure
of the field
Fig. 4.1 Mind map dealing with violent actors
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peacefully in the political arena. In this case, it might involve actors who 
exercise force in the operations area and who thereby make financial gain 
through smuggling. The exercise of force is an outward manifestation of 
maintaining control over a smuggling operation. These actors are more 
interested in economic power than political power and should be tackled 
accordingly. This knowledge is of course important to enable an under-
standing of the actors and motives driving the current wave of violence 
in the operations area. David Kilcullen writes that in Afghanistan 3000–
4000 of the Taliban (which were approximately 10% of them) were 
“hard-core fanatics who are not reconcilable under any circumstances”.13 
It is important to use not only physical violence, but foremost symbolic 
violence on these individuals. This can be discrediting them in religious, 
social, political, ethnic or economic ways. It is either this or giving up the 
idea that there is a cultural element in conflict, which there often is. That 
we, the West, for example, want to impose democracy on “the others” 
as that is something the West as a society believes to be objectively right 
like a jihadist believes in Islamic law as objectively right. Some people 
are hard to reach and that must be acknowledged as a fact and treated 
accordingly, with force if necessary.
Another method problem is the purely operational one of establishing 
collaboration between the military units and the various forms of volun-
tary organisations (NGOs). The latter often have a policy not to collabo-
rate with military units. However, this problem lies outside the scope of 
the possible for a study of this nature; it will require a favourably prag-
matic approach to operations in the field.
By way of introduction, it should be said that ethnic cleansing 
and genocide do not occur in all conflict situations. No matter what 
International law says; there are plenty of examples of people being 
forced to flee an area, or being killed just because of ethnicity and not 
because of some kind of actions taken on the victim’s behalf. There is no 
shortage of plight and suffering among those who find themselves with 
the “wrong” ethnicity or nationality. This text is concerned with opera-
tional realities for forces on the ground, rather than definitions made for 
political reasons. International law is only normative if there are interests 
from important national states—which often can be condensed down 
to the USA, Russia or ex-colonial states in the region—so if an event 
13 Kilcullen (2009, p. 49).
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is called ethnic cleansing or not by International law is to a large extent 
politics. This does of course not stop experts in International law from 
having opinions that differ from what the world community decides is 
ethnic cleansing or not. At least ethnic cleansing has, however, proved 
to be a common element of the low-intensity conflicts waged since the 
Cold War. The process follows a relatively linear course and the breaking 
point may be said to illustrate a case of “external shock”.14 It is then that 
the legitimacy of current norms is questioned in practice and not just in 
rhetoric. The reasoning also pre-supposes that explanatory models, such 
as Christopher Browning’s in Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 
101 and the Final Solution in Poland, are valid. Namely, that perceived 
conditions are of decisive importance, if not of sole importance, as a pre-
cursor to genocide.15 In the case of Yugoslavia, the process took place 
sequentially in a number of stages seen as separate outbreaks of the 
fighting. The fighting in Eastern Slavonia is an example of comprehen-
sive state-controlled ethnic cleansing. This same type of phase occurred 
in the opening stages in Bosnia when the Bosnian Serbs enjoyed their 
initial successes. The expelling of, for example, the Kosovo Albanians 
from Kosovo may be seen as another key phase in the complicated course 
of events in Yugoslavia. This purge was conducted by special units, like 
Arkan’s Tigers—led by Željko “Arkan” Ražnatović—who initially dem-
onstrated a marked capacity for violent and spectacular action.16 Some 
think that it took until 2002 for the logic of ethnic cleansing just to 
begin to erode, but still not to be reversed.17
When the method for analysis has been chosen—quantitative or quali-
tative as discussed above—the next question to address is which method 
will be used to start influencing the field. In short, it would be fair to 
say that the method chosen will be a mix of the alternatives positioned 
between targeting and hearts and minds. The former involves getting 
to the actors one wants to influence, by either providing incentives or 
14 Farrell (2005, p. 14).
15 Browning (1998, p. 173).
16 The fact the Arkan’s Tigers had a film team with them on at least one occasion 
strengthens the theory that their mission was to create conditions for a war of ethnic char-
acter, de Graaff (2003, p. 118). See also Allin (2002, p. 59).
17 Allin (2002, p. 44). See Sell (2002). for more about paramilitary forces at the opening 
stages of the war, p. 165.
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limiting their room for manoeuvre (which in extreme cases may mean 
killing someone, a fact one should not turn a blind eye to when military 
operations are involved). The latter involves altering the structure of the 
field so that certain patterns of behaviour become unacceptable in the 
social field of the area of operations. In reality, it rarely involves a narrow 
focus on either actors or structures, but a blend of alternative courses of 
action.
As an epilogue, it is fair to mention that some actors are multifac-
etted and might have different appearances at the same time. One has 
to choose how to act with caution. An actor like PIRA, for example, 
could choose to use Sinn Fein, the political arm of the movement if the 
military tactics were less suitable at a certain time, only to shift to the 
military focus later on. The same goes with Hamas and Hezbollah, for 
example, they too can act on different parts of the social field depending 
on the circumstances. This does not make the model less suitable, it is 
very suitable in order to identify how these actors behave and why.
bibLiograPhy
Allin, D. H. (2002). Nato’s Balkan interventions. Oxford: Routledge.
Bowyer, R. (1999). Dictionary of military terms. London: Bloomsbury 
Reference.
Browning, C. R. (1998). Helt vanliga män: Reservpolisbataljon 101 och den slut-
liga lösningen i Polen. Stockholm: Norstedts.
Eckstein, H. (1965). On the etiology of internal wars. History and Theory, 4, 2.
Farrell, T. (2005). The norms of war: Cultural belief and modern conflict. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Ferris, J. (2004). Netcentric warfare, C4ISR and information operations. In L. 
V. Scott & P. D. Jackson (Eds.), Understanding intelligence in the twenty-first 
century. journeys in shadows. London: Routledge.
Graaff de, B. (2003). The wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s: Bringing the 
state back in. In J. Ångström & I. Duyvesteyn (Eds.), The nature of Modern 
War: Clausewitz and His critics revisited. Stockholm: Swedish National 
Defence College.
Kalyvas, S. N. (2009). The logic of violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Kilcullen, D. (2009). The accidental guerrilla. Fighting small wars in the midst of 
a big one. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sell, L. (2002). Slobodan Milošević and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham: 
Duke University Press.
48  H. GUNNERIUSSON
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 





The Pre-war Strategic Situation  
in the Balkans from a Field Theory 
Perspective
© The Author(s) 2017 
H. Gunneriusson, Bordieuan Field Theory as an Instrument 
for Military Operational Analysis, New Security Challenges, 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65352-5_5
Abstract  The following is a short account of the events leading up 
to war in the Balkans, in particular in Bosnia. The intention and over-
all description in these few pages will help provide an example of the 
practical application of a field theory perspective to conflict, rather than 
describing the conflict in full. Some actors are chosen as examples for 
the purpose of theoretical explanation, even though there are others to 
focus on if one wants a complete historical account. Main actors as for 
example Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tudjman are also presented in 
this chapter.
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Something which must be stressed in this discussion is that Bosnia is 
a relatively small country (51,129 square kilometre), about the size of 
Costa Rica.1 The limited area is important to note. It therefore requires 
very few criminal elements to influence opinion to the point where peo-
ple are prepared to carry out ethnic cleansing by directive or as a form 
of revenge. A system of informal criminal networks, involved in the 
1 CIA Factbook (2017). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
[Visited 170509].
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trafficking of people, weapons, drugs etc., was established as in all con-
flicts, with various actors using violent means to establish their territories 
(meaning here primarily not physical territory).2 Partly, because of this 
professor, Mary Kaldor has described this form of conflict and this spe-
cific conflict as a new form of war. Kaldor thus writes that she has identi-
fied a new form of war which has emerged since the Cold War, involving 
more or less organised violence between different parties (often not 
states). The motives behind this phenomenon are many and varied.
As I put a theoretical perspective of my own on the conflict, I would 
like at this point to dwell a little on Kaldor’s ideas, ideas which have 
met some criticism.3 Her view of the informal economy as the driving 
force behind the war is essentially correct; she makes a fundamental point 
when highlighting the presence of the criminal world as an influential 
force. In bourdieuan terms, one could refer to a changing social field. 
That said, I would like to take issue with many of the theories she pro-
motes. One problem is that history shows us plenty of examples of the 
fact that the parameters for the “new” wars already have existed and still 
exist; it is easy to recognise the phenomenon from history. The informal 
economy is not new, certainly not where war is being waged. People in 
the West today are used to regarding war as something that takes place 
between sovereign states. However, one does not need to look too far 
back in time to see the processes that Kaldor describes as part of just 
about every nation-building process that has occurred in Europe (this 
is probably also true for other parts of the world, but certainly holds 
generally throughout Europe). She highlights globalisation as a new 
contributing factor to this new type of war. It must be said that the con-
sequences of war now have a more wide-ranging influence, but that this 
should affect events in a qualitatively new fashion remains to be proved. 
Breeding grounds for unrest have taken on a new significance within 
criminal circles, when all sorts of illegal transport make its way through 
the lawless country like electricity conducted through copper. There has, 
2 For an interpretation see Kaldor (1999, p. 105).
3 Krampe (2010).
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however, always been interest shown by criminal groups to fill the vac-
uum left by a (failed) state; therein lies nothing new.4
Kaldor focuses often on the Napoleonic Wars, which were essentially 
state-controlled, and consequently her studies contain a large number 
of clausewitzian references. She also focused on the state entity in his 
analyses, for which he in turn received a fair amount of criticism.5 What 
also occurred during the Napoleonic Wars was that Westphalian Europe, 
in many regards what remained of the Europe of the Middle Ages, was 
struck from the map. Territorially cohesive areas came to dominate, ruled 
over by a power often concentrated in one person, such as a king or 
emperor.6 The period clearly encompasses the little-discussed history of 
the losers of the time, revealing the struggle of the small nations against 
the large national states, and this applies equally to the course of events 
that not only Kaldor described as state-directed war. There is therefore 
cause to exercise caution when one generalises, because contradictions 
can remain hidden in examples chosen. However, to speak in qualitative 
terms of new forms of war is just as unwise as stating that revolutions 
occur during war.7 It is certainly true that Kaldor makes many com-
mendable points in her book, they predominate without question. What 
I do take objection to is the intractable desire to discover something new 
when there exists little foundation for the theory. Talking about a new 
type of war is going too far, because the distinction made hardly war-
rants such a conclusion. On the other hand, Kaldor presents a reasonably 
adequate picture of how violent conflict, with states as just one of many 
actors on the stage, has manifested and continues to manifest itself.
4 A theoretical use of the terms state and nation would have lent Kaldor’s research the 
depth that it currently lacks. Neither in Yugoslavia nor during the nation-building processes 
of the 1700s and 1800s can the term state be said to have been more of a driving force for 
violence than the term nation.
5 van Creveld (1991) and Keegan (1993).
6 Foreign enclaves deep in the realm disappeared. An example of this is Avignon in 
the centre of France, many German free cities disappeared, in fact, only four free cities 
remained of the countless numbers that existed before the Napoleonic Wars.
7 In addition, it must be stated that Kaldor’s closing chapter, which presents a vision of a 
cosmopolitan world order, is at the expense of historical experience. When Kaldor encour-
ages the reader to incline towards outstanding researchers such as Zygmunt Bauman and 
Norbert Elias on one side or the author herself on the other, then the choice easily falls in 
favour of the overwhelming force of evidence presented by the former. The two former are 
not pessimistic because it pleases them. Their pessimism is founded on a sound knowledge 
of mankind and its history.
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Demonstrating theory using empirical examples is not the same as an 
empirical application of the theory. It is worth differentiating here; if the 
lead up to the conflict in former Yugoslavia had been understood in field 
theory terms at both the strategic and tactical level then the scenario may 
well have had a different character—it is even possible that the course 
of events would have unfolded in a different way. A related approach, 
though not the same, to the events has been taken by the researcher V.P. 
Gagnon. He has picked up a somewhat poststructuralist view when he 
writes that:
Elites who are highly dependent on the existing structures of power, 
and for whom change would mean a total loss of access to and control 
over resources, will be much more willing to pursue strategies that are 
extremely destructive to society overall.8
This holds some truth and certainly in the example of Yugoslavia. But 
society must present a social space, which allows those strategies to be 
used in a legitimate way. Furthermore, the actors must be structured 
so that they actually take the opportunity to use this space of possibili-
ties which the structure of society present. In short, both the actors and 
society need a certain structure, otherwise, the violent scenario does not 
play out. This is the closest to a law we can come. If it was not for the 
play between society and actors then such a case as the one in Yugoslavia 
would play out more often than it does. Michael Mann is also preoccu-
pied with the question of responsibility:
If a few bad guys were responsible, how did they acquire such magical 
powers of coercion and manipulation? And were they quite so coherent in 
their planning; so in charge of events? After all, atrocities were committed 
by thousands of persons, and many more thousands stood around, either 
egging them on or doing nothing to stop them.9
On the other hand, he does not—compared to Gagnon but certainly 
not compared to this text—venture very much into the structuralism 
8 Gagnon (2004, p. 29).
9 Mann (2005, p. 360).
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explanations. Nevertheless, the question is valid and fits well into the 
perspective of social field theory. Nationalism in various forms was not 
an unknown phenomenon in Yugoslavia, which came into being after the 
First World War.10 Often nationalism is placed in a political right corner, 
in opposition to, for example, communism. However, nationalism does 
not hold any values, which make it a given rightist entity. Nationalism is 
about power and can be a tool in anyone’s hand as long as legitimacy is 
granted. Nationalism was present in communist countries, even the offi-
cial communistic architecture contained nationalistic features.11 In both 
countries, the issue of nationalism was complex, both having a popula-
tion consisting of many different national identities. In Yugoslavia, the 
situation was further complicated by the fact that the official war heroes, 
the partisans revered from recent history, were intimately associated with 
the nation. Furthermore and more importantly, they were associated 
with communist ideology since the partisan movement—the People’s 
Liberation Movement (Narodnooslobodilački pokret, NOP)—was after 
all Marxist. When communist ideology lost its legitimacy after 1989, 
the prestige (symbolic capital)  enjoyed by the partisan movement also 
disappeared. The state of Yugoslavia had to a large extent built its legit-
imacy on this now-eroded ideological foundation. Yugoslavian national-
ism was not very strong, which can easily be explained by the fact that 
it was a state with many nations, i.e. not a national state but a state with 
nations. In Yugoslavia, alternatives lay just below the surface, especially 
in the form of the earlier defeated movements in Serbia and Croatia. 
Yugoslavian nationalism had problems finding any support as there were 
alternatives with stronger roots. An outstanding opportunity to fill the 
political vacuum with new forms of capital therefore presented itself 
for those prepared to take it after the fall of the Eastern Bloc: power-
ful nationalist forces fuelled by crisis and approaching anarchy boosted 
by the fall of communism. This structural change of the world political 
order was important for the way Yugoslavia was structured, as for all of 
Eastern Europe.
10 First called “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes”.
11 Kaldor (1999, p. 79). Mary Kaldor, like many others, has emphasised the importance 
of nationalism both in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia.
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Both the Serbian Chetnik and the Croatian Ustasha movements had 
been suppressed by the conquering communist power. There was there-
fore a need to reinvent the cultural area, which was called Yugoslavia. It 
was a process about getting rid of the effects of decade long symbolic 
violence against the historic opposition to the fallen communist regime 
to which those who sympathised with Serbian and Croatian nationalist 
ideals could affiliate themselves with. In turn, the economic crisis that 
followed the collapse of the communist system also provided a fertile 
breeding ground for extremist ideas. As a result of the nationalist move-
ments of their recent past, both countries were strong, and the Serbs’ 
and Croats’ unwillingness to share power in Yugoslavia, in a way that was 
acceptable to both, served to weaken the cohesion of the rather weak 
Yugoslav nationalism.12 The period between the early 1980s with Tito’s 
death and the early 1990s can be described as a period of ethnification in 
Yugoslavia, where, for example, promotion of Serbian symbols in Serbia 
became stronger over time. One can talk about a mobilisation of history 
for political purposes, a construction of the past.
It is important to point out that these nationalistic expressions could 
not be traced back over hundreds of years; they were not of ancient ori-
gin. It did not have its origins in conflicts inspired by cultural determin-
ism. The reinvented opposition against Yugoslavia was founded in the 
Yugoslavia of the 1900s, which had seen so much criminality.13 The eth-
nic cleansing of the type that occurred during the 1900s in Yugoslavia 
and in Bosnia in particular was not a necessary step in the national 
deconstruction and reconstruction processes, even in the Balkans. There 
were underlying factors, such as the nationalist movements mentioned 
above and the crimes committed during the Second World War, which 
bedded for the events of the 1900s.14 These factors described the logic 
12 For dissent between Serbs and Croats see also Naimark (2001, p. 140).
13 Cohen (1993, p. 238). It is also emphasised here that hatred between ethnic groups 
did not exist before the Second World War. The Nazi Ustasha state should be mentioned as 
a major actor, as the Chetnik movement and the partisans but also the Albanian oppression 
of Serbs in the Italian controlled Kosovo.
14 As a reference for someone who saw the crimes committed against the Bosnian 
Muslims as a religious issue: Pasha Mohamed Ali Taeharah. An Introduction to Islamism. 
Author House (2005, p. 24).
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of practice, which the reinvented movements could draw legitimacy 
from. The logic of practice was no more precise than that ethnic cleans-
ing was a viable alternative; it could then be expanded to new conflicts, 
as the one between Bosnians and Croats.
One can at this point question the relevance of stressing that oppo-
sition did not stretch back over hundreds of years. Certainly, there is a 
point in putting an end to the myth that a desire to wage civil war is 
something that lies in the genes of any people—it is an important factor, 
but if one is interested in the events of the 1900s, one cannot minimise 
the fact that the Second World War is part of the collective habitus even 
for those who didn’t experience it. Of course, the exact implications of 
this depend on what kind of narrative the actors (collective or individual) 
are being fed. At the same time, the model supports a structural perspec-
tive that the actors are given the freedom to choose their own approach, 
regardless of the effect of the structure. It is likely that Yugoslavia would 
have fallen apart regardless of who held political power. However, with-
out the conscious policies of Milošević and Tudjman, extreme violence 
would not have marked the course of events.15 Discussing which one of 
them was foremost or more of a driving force is in this context imma-
terial, since it is not a question of apportioning guilt, but rather than 
stressing the dynamic inherent in the fact that at least two different polit-
ical themes—one about centralise Yugoslavia under a single command 
and one about making Croatia autonomous—could paradoxically sup-
port each other.
However, in Milošević’s case, one can say that his policy of radi-
calisation was the foundation of the power base, he later established in 
Serbian politics. From having held a strong, but not unique, position 
with communist leanings in Parliament, he became the leading Serbian 
politician with a strongly nationalist manifesto.16 From Milošević’s rise 
to power in 1987, the media in Belgrade was very much in his hand, at 
15 Naimark (2001, p. 139). See also Donia and Fine (1994, p. 11). The claim is made 
that the Second World War was the first occasion when ethnic cleansing occurred in Bosnia.
16 This is described more fully by Sell (2002). Particularly Chap. 2 for Milosevic’s radi-
calisation programme and rise to power and Chap. 3 for when the agenda takes a more 
violent form.
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least up to 1990. Milošević was among the most prominent leaders of 
the Communist Party during the late 1980s, but he also saw the per-
ceived rift between Serbian interests and communism. Some observers 
have thought that “communism was viewed as the thing that was weak-
ening the Serbs’ position”.17 Another observer has written that Milošević 
“seemed to stumble almost by accident on the nationalistic card in April 
1987, in the small town of Kosovo Field, next to the famous battle-
field”.18 He followed up with his speech at Gazimestan—the battlefield 
600 years ago of mythic proportions in Serbian history. “Six centu-
ries later we are once again in battles, and facing battles. They are not 
armed battles, though the possibility cannot be excluded”.19 Milošević 
had clearly adopted a more nationalistic approach, which was in line 
with the currents of politics in all of Eastern Europe at the time. He 
had already been one of the actors able to decide the agenda, but now 
as the producer for national politics, he listened attentively to the views 
prevalent in the strong consumer currents of Serbian politics at the time, 
which (greatly) enhanced his position. To be fair towards Milošević, one 
should mention that although he had consecrating power on at least the 
Serbian political field, there were also other political actors who encour-
aged extremism. The poet and the then not really active in politics Vuk 
Drašković, for example, raised the provocative question in 1989 “where 
are the Western borders of Serbia, and how far do they extend?”20 In 
this case, there is structuring structures at work with a political field 
steering actors into certain behaviour who in their turn structure the 
field—mutually strengthen each other. In addition, Milošević was more 
important than Tudjman, because Serbia was to a marked degree the 
cement holding Yugoslavia together—not least because the capital city 
17 Pavlakovic´ (2005, pp. 2, 16).
18 Mann (2005, p. 369). I do not mean that the Balkans have a stronger willingness to 
embrace myths than for example Western Europe. I state that there were myths in play—
and probably still are—and that is the state of most cultures. See (Todorova 2005, p. 153).
19 Quoted in Mann (2005, p. 370).
20 Stojanovic (2000, p. 462).
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lay in Serbia. If Serbia did not recognise the union, then there would be 
little incentive for it to hold together, so what happened in Serbia then 
mattered very much more than what happened in Croatia. These two 
politicians have been described as Tudjman being the more “fanatical 
nationalist” and Milošević as the opportunistic one.21 It is also true that 
Tudjman had a stronger position in Croatia than Milošević had in Serbia. 
A position built on Tudjman and this party HDZ: “dictating a political 
discourse of authoritarianism and xenophobic nationalism”.22 Tudjman 
had a background of radical nationalism, serving two terms in jail due 
to Croatian nationalistic activity.23 Robert Hayden discusses Tudjman’s 
view on nations and nationalism in the terms that the view could eas-
ily be flipped into being a racist view of looking at nations.24 This in its 
turn gives a greater understanding of how the coming ethnic cleansings 
in Croatia came about.
Presented with a specific empirical situation, the actors are given a 
horizon of possible courses of action to follow. In a radical situation such 
as a state of war, individuals will react within the framework in a way 
unique to that situation. This may mean that many in a civilised society 
react by, for example, fleeing to another country. But the underlying and 
radical cultural manifestation, which makes up part of an individual’s hab-
itus, may lead to individuals either collectively or individually reacting vio-
lently; despite the fact that a short while ago to all appearances they could 
not be told apart from anybody else on the street. It concerns cultural 
dispositions, which are not always that easy to identify except in retro-
spect. The approach both differs from and has interplay with the concept 
of external shock. Researchers into military culture often subscribe to 
the widely held opinion that external shock is necessary to undermine 
the legitimacy of cultural norms.25 It is therefore also likely that a trig-
ger factor will be required if a change to cultural norms is to be effected. 
21 Allin (2002, p. 22).
22 Sekulic et al. (2006, p. 808).
23 Sell (2002, p. 115).
24 Hayden (1992, p. 663).
25 Farrell (2005, p. 14).
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However, one cannot be at all sure that structures within a culture (not 
the same as cultural norms) do not exist, which may well incline collec-
tive or particular individuals to violent behaviour. It should also be borne 
in mind that any intense experience will contribute to the forming of an 
individual’s habitus. Violent events thus serve to stretch the bounds of 
what for an individual is capable of so that previously inaccessible violent 
agendas are afforded space. Christopher Browning’s account of the action 
of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 in Poland is an example of this.
At this point, a résumé of field theory is useful. This states that those 
who really possess the power to change the illusio of the field, the actual 
definition of the field, are the actors with strong capital on the left-hand 
side of the field.26 The left side of the field is the autonomous area, where 
the actors/institutions that play according to the field’s own rule are to 
be found. On the right are the actors who follow rules other than those 
prescribed by the field. In the political field constituted by Yugoslavia, 
Milošević and Tudjman were by far and away the strongest political actors. 
Initially, they operated in the upper left quadrant of the field. By virtue 
of their prestige, they had the power to change the rules of the field. The 
nationalist agenda of both individuals lent legitimacy to their conduct of 
politics by violent, rather than peaceful means. The pursuance of policies 
using violent means was an unknown strategy for the left side of the field, 
at least until the most respected actors in the upper part of the left field 
began lending an air of legitimacy to violent tactics. One can compare 
with a statement regarding Iraq: “in the general’s words, the ethnosectar-
ian violence of 2006 had torn apart the very fabric of Iraqi society”.27
A further consequence of Tudjman’s and Milošević’s actions was that 
if the most powerful actors on the left side of the field weakened the 
appeal of politics by constitutional means and further put force behind a 
violent approach, then this would affect the regard in which the remain-
ing political actors were held. The actors who continued to choose the 
constitutional path found their prestige increasingly eroded, while those 
who altered their political approach in line with the new violent laws of 
the field found themselves rewarded—to say nothing of the actors who 
occupied a permanent position on the right side of the field.
26 Consecrating power, the laying on of hands, which certain powerful actors possess as 
a result of their prestige (symbolic capital) and/or their official position. These actors have 
the power to determine the value of other actors or positions on the field.
27 Kilcullen (2009, p. 131).
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It should be noted that the friction between the ethnic and the con-
stitutional models was already discernible in Serbia at the time of the 
First World War, there being few with Yugoslavian inclinations among 
the Serbian intellectual elite.28 This should be borne in mind, since 
Milošević’s main political opponents in Serbia were also extreme Serbian 
nationalists like, for example, Vuk Drašković and Vojislav Šešelj.29 The lat-
ter built the Chetnik movement into a fighting force when the violence 
began to take hold.30 This may serve as a clear example of how a politi-
cian switches from a civil political agenda to one of violence, as a result of 
the political rules of the field changing. As one can see, there were under-
lying spaces of possibilities which opened up with the fall of the Eastern 
Bloc. Much of the political agenda reinvented a political field, which drew 
legitimacy from the field as it looked like before the communist era.
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Abstract  This chapter deals with the continuation of the conflict and the 
breaking up of Yugoslavia. By 1990, Federal Yugoslavia was unpopular. 
Most Yugoslavs wanted to move from communism to democracy, yet 
they associated federation with communism and Serb domination.
Keywords  Yugoslavia · 1990 · Communism · Serbia
Outside of Serbia, almost all wanted decentralising reforms, but most 
Serbs disliked the decentralisation that had already occurred.1 The 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia collapsed on 20–22 January 1990, 
when Slovenia and Croatia left the Congress that was held. When SFRY 
(Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) collapsed, SPS (Socialist Party of 
Serbia) stressed that where Serbs were in majority, they should be able 
to say that they wanted to remain in the Yugoslavian state. In March 
1990, a new Serbian constitution was ratified, limiting the autonomy 
1 Mann (2005, p. 366).
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of Vojvodina and Kosovo.2 This was a strike against Yugoslavia as an 
entity. No new president could be elected for Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s because Milošević controlled the republics and blocked the sole 
presidential candidate all according to the parliamentary system of 
Yugoslavia. The position Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia vot-
ing for the presidential candidate, and Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and 
Montenegro voting against. 3 This process has been described as a slide 
from centralism towards confederalism, which is true. This change of the 
political field also had an impact on the military. It resulted in the JNA 
(Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, i.e. The Army) partly redefining its role 
and eventually its conception of itself.4
It is interesting to note that the republics that were soon to break 
away, Slovenia and Croatia, were at this stage still in favour of hold-
ing Yugoslavia together, even if it looked as if later they would sepa-
rate from the federation. If that presidential election had had a positive 
result, with the installation of a president, there would still have been 
accepted constitutional structures in place to lean back on during the 
partitioning process, which would have led to a more peaceful course of 
events. As it turned out, relatively undeveloped areas like Kosovo (and 
even Montenegro might be regarded as undeveloped) came to stifle the 
desire to move in that direction in more developed areas like Croatia 
and Slovenia—and in comparison especially with Kosovo, in the more 
industrialised Bosnia. This created what is usually known as a demo-
cratic deficit, albeit the term is more appropriately used in connection 
with established democracies. Nevertheless, the situation generated a 
feeling of inherent injustice and illegitimacy towards the constitution of 
Yugoslavia. This ought to have contributed to strengthening the desire 
of Croatia and Slovenia to go their own way. Meanwhile in Bosnia—after 
the elections of 1990—extremism came in focus in Bosnia. For example, 
Karadic’s Serbian Democratic Party (SDS; Srpska Demokratska Stranka) 
2 Kerenji (2005, p. 367).
3 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 214). Dyker and Vejvoda (1996), claim that Croatia for the 
most part blocked all possibility of a federal election. p. 19.
4 Dulić and Kostic (2010, p. 1064).
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slid from a moderate line towards a more extreme one.5 After the weak 
results in the election, SDS became more nationalistic speaking of the 
western borders of Serbia and saying that they wanted peace, but the 
current status was more like capitulation than peace.6
The ones who had actively supported a united Yugoslavia were mar-
ginalised by the obvious hopelessness of trying to elect a federal pres-
ident, and the surge of confederalistic or even separatist rhetoric. 
Expressed in theoretical terms, this marginalisation can be viewed as a 
loss of capital, the ability to influence the political field being reduced, 
while those with agendas other than a united Yugoslavia gained wider 
room for manoeuvre. Milošević and SPS presented themselves as being 
a more moderate alternative to many other parties from 1990 onwards.7 
By the SPS victory with 45.8% on 9 December 1990, the member-
ship had risen largely due to new members. The SPS went to election 
with slogans of peace and prosperity, in opposition to more nationalis-
tic alternatives. Serb communists moved towards nationalism in order 
to prevent giving the opposition monopoly of it. The restructured field 
forced restructuring on the actors, and the space of possibilities for them 
changed accordingly.
Kosovo was the start for an expression of opinion along Serbian lines 
which then surfaced in other parts of Yugoslavia. The events in Kosovo 
in 1990 signalled to the whole of Yugoslavia, and certainly to Slovenia 
and Croatia, that Milošević not only practiced nationalist rhetoric but 
also had a coordinated policy line. On 8 of September, the Serbian con-
stitution was changed, drastically reducing the autonomy previously 
enjoyed by Vojvodina and Kosovo.8 This upsets the legitimacy of the 
5 Gagnon (2004, p. 50).
6 Stojanovic (2000, p. 469). May 1991 was the time when Mirko Petrovic talked about 
the western borders.
7 Gagnon (2004, p. 46). In the 1992 election, Milosevic was challenged by Milan Panic 
in selling the moderate line. Ibid, Gagnon noting a working paper of his.
8 Udovicki and Torov (1997, p. 92).
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political system and thus made way for alternate ways of carrying out 
politics. It should be noted in this connection that there were a number 
of background factors that made Milošević’s nationalist agenda viable, 
but it was his political strategy that was the initiating and driving force. 
A similar question is whether a German war of revenge would have taken 
place had it not been for Hitler. The answer is probably given, the harsh 
Versailles treaty. Would the Holocaust have taken place without Hitler? 
The answer is no, at least no if the Nazis did not come to power but 
some other right-wing movement with no specific anti-semitic agenda.9 
The comparison is made not to put Milošević on a level with Hitler, 
which would be outrageous, but to show that structural change often is 
difficult, regardless of which actors are involved. Both the Second World 
War and the partitioning of Yugoslavia were examples of this phenom-
enon. On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and the 
Holocaust during World War II would be hard to imagine without actors 
that at least had the same type of agenda as the two leaders named above.
Both the Serbian and Bosnian nationalist movements repeatedly 
referred to the Second World War, in order to create a sense of conti-
nuity for and lend legitimacy to their own movements. This approach 
is relatively common, regardless of whether it concerns politics, science, 
business or other areas. Institutions or people who had high reputa-
tions in the past in the eyes of a particular group will still be of current 
value and also used because of that very value. It is a question of iden-
tifying oneself with the symbolic capital of the actor or institution con-
cerned and thereby strengthening one’s own position at the same time.10 
Tudjman was an accomplished politician of the Realpolitik genre and 
may have seen that these Nazi references were favourably regarded by 
the Croatian diaspora.11 Many of these had fled Yugoslavia after the 
Second World War, and even if new generations had come, the nation-
alistic master narrative sprung from the Ustasha Croatia was strong in 
the diaspora. The same can be said about the Serbs to some extent. 
Serbia started to run a satellite TV channel of its own, mostly because 
9 This argument is first made by the nazi-German dissident Sebastian Haffner. Haffner 
(1991, p. 216).
10 Gunneriusson (2002, p. 38).
11 Dulić (2009, p. 263).
6 THE EVENTS IN 1990  67
they wanted to reach the Serbian diaspora. Many of those had emi-
grated because of rightist Chetnik sympathies in the generation before 
or even the same generation.12 They were disposed to be affected by the 
propaganda. Both diasporas had power not only because of their abil-
ity to work on the opinion abroad which is a form of PSYOPs by proxy, 
but also that they had more financial assets than those in the former 
Yugoslavia had at the time.
It was of no great concern that these movements might not gain legit-
imacy in the eyes of the international community in general since their 
policies were geared for those who identified themselves as Croatian in 
general. This almost paradoxical form of connection occurred at several 
levels. Franjo Tudjman (created Croatian President on 30 May 1990) 
declared himself ready to cast off the Nazi yoke that had lain over the 
Croatian state since the Second World War, when Croatia had been a 
satellite state. According to Tudjman, this would best be achieved by 
destroying the memorials to the victims of the outrages committed in 
the earlier Croatian state.13 The process involved partly removing all 
trace of the exponents of the former system’s symbolic capital, and partly 
served to increase the capital of Franjo Tudjman himself. Paradoxically 
enough, making a connection between the former and current states 
of Croatia was unnecessary, since the budding Croatian state was a new 
state; an opportunity for a fresh start was lost. Tudjman made television 
in Croatia a part of his party’s (HDZ) domain as soon as he came to 
power. The press was also brought under control relatively effectively.14 
The information arena was not neglected as a means to hold and rein-
force power.
Tudjman was the one who made the equation between the two 
Croatian states. In contrast to casting off the Nazi yoke, he tied the old 
state’s identity to that of the new state. The second string to Tudjman’s 
ultranationalist bow was to manipulate the historiography of geno-
cide of the Serbian people committed by the Ustasha state during the 
Second World War. The researcher Tomislav Dulić writes that Tudjman 
used three different arguments to downplay the atrocities commit-
ted by Ustasha. Firstly, Tudjman states that there have been Serbian 
12 Dimitrijevic (2000, p. 638 and notes 17 and 18).
13 Udovicki and Torov (1997, p. 111).
14 Balas (1997, p. 266).
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exaggerations; secondly, that some sources have been at fault; thirdly, 
that he relativises the events.15 How and to whom he catered these the-
ses is one thing, but it does also say something about how Tudjman was 
structured and how his space of possibilities was constructed. Since the 
1950s, he had worked on a revisionist history to reduce the blame put 
on the Ustasha Croatian state during World War Two.16 This was not 
a new idea for him, based on pure opportunism. Apparently, he did not 
see the actions of the Ustasha as very wrong so one can assume that he 
was disposed to not only forgive such actions but also consecrate them if 
the right situation appeared again for something similar to happen.
This resulted in morbid, but certainly, necessary countermeasures 
being taken by the Serbs when Serbian mass graves were dug up in the 
summers of 1989 and 1990 in Krajina, Croatia, to counteract Tudjman’s 
falsification of history.17 The Krajina area in Croatia was used as a token 
which both politicians played on, as Tudjman wanted Croatian auton-
omy, and Milošević said that it was impossible with the old Serbian 
settlement Krajina within its borders.18 The region was an old Serbian 
settlement, called “the military border” where the Croatian Ustashi 
regime conducted genocide against Serbs during World War Two.19 
After the elections in 1990, the Serb leadership in the region proclaimed 
the area an autonomous region (an oblast) which came to have different 
names during its existence.
Tudjman also denied Croatia’s part in the Holocaust during the 
Second World War.20 In addition, Franjo Tudjman declared that the 
Ustasha state was a worthy predecessor to modern Croatia.21 This type 
of unwholesome retrospective historical connection enabled these former 
17 Loc. cit. This was mainly a success as the US policy included the ethnic cleansing of 
Krajina, where Serbs had lived for 500 years. The Americans saw it as “recapturing the ter-
ritory from the Serbs”. Allin (2002, p. 30).
18 Glenny (1992, p. 37).
19 Sell (2002, p. 113).
20 Ramet (1999, p. 51).
21 Naimark (2001, p. 154).
15 Dulić (2009, p. 264).
16 Dulić (2009, p. 278).
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criminal deeds to move from the era of the Second World War to the 
surface of the contemporary political agenda. Croatian units also used 
Ustasha insignia, which strengthened ties with the past and contrib-
uted to eradicating the difference between the present and the past.22 
HDZ success came from playing on threats from Belgrade and on the 
surge for alternatives to communism.23 In addition, Tudjman’s policies 
lent legitimacy to Milošević’s policies, by confirming that which aggres-
sive nationalism was saying the Serbs had been subjected to. This led to 
an undermining of the reputations of those who opposed Milošević in 
Serbia, when he was seen to be obviously right, given the context, in the 
light of Tudjman’s actions.
Budding Serb nationalism was, paradoxically enough, the very breath 
of life for the politics of Tudjman in Croatia and vice versa.24 Serb 
nationalistic intellectuals provided further arguments along the lines of 
ethnicity and nation.25 Croatia had the support of the West from the 
very start and right through to the end of the conflict, in contrast to 
the rest of Yugoslavia. This is noteworthy bearing in mind what the 
country stood for and did; the regime was virtually a mirror image of 
the more vocal Serbian nationalistic politicians. These are the central 
elements to the understanding of the internal conditions in Yugoslavia 
before violence came to the surface. The same type of mutual relation-
ship was visible between Likud and the PLO, especially under the lead-
ership of Arafat. The latter had seen his reputation weakened among 
the Palestinian people, but he enjoyed an upswing during the unrest of 
1996. Arafat as well as Likud needed an external enemy in order to be 
able to use the image in their domestic arenas.26 So, one can see that 
there was a drive towards radicalisation in politics before the major hos-
tilities broke out.
In Serbian politics, Milošević could take steps towards the break-up 
of Yugoslavia and eventually war, much because he was not very extreme 
22 Naimark (2001, p. 157 (about Second World War references being used) and p. 172).
23 Gagnon (2004, p. 47).
24 For the interlinking connection between the politics of Tudjmans and Milosevic, see, 
for example, Udovicki and Torov (1997, p. 93) and Stitkovac (1997, pp. 156 and 158), 
also Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 174).
25 Sell (2002, p. 111).
26 Hammes (2006, p. 117).
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in comparison. Vojislav Šešelj and Vuk Drašković went on with different 
radical projects. On 18 June 1990, Vojislav Šešelj founded the Serbian 
Chetnik Movement as an attempt at a party, but authorities refused to 
register it as a party.27 Vuk Drašković became the leader of SPO (The 
Serbian Renewal Movement, Srpski Pokret Obnove) which he started. 
In the beginning, SPO was formed as a pyramid organisation with an 
“unimpeachable leader”.28 Before the war in Croatia, in May 1990, the 
SPO wanted autonomous Serbian regions in Krajina, Istria, Dubrovnik 
and 4 regions in Bosnia.29 On 7 January 1990, Vuc Drašković pro-
claimed that the goal of his party was “the creation of a democratic, mul-
tiparty Serbian state within her historical and ethnic borders”.30 From 
July to December 1990, one-third of SPO’s statements were about the 
national question. Correspondingly, only 6% of SPS and DS statements 
concerned this.31
The role of the Orthodox Church could be mentioned as the text 
deals mostly with the politics in Serbia, and the church indeed played a 
political role on the social field of politics in Yugoslavia. Bishop Simeon 
Zlokovic´ was a critic of both Tudjman and Milošević. He saw them 
both as representatives of extremes on the right–left political scale. 
This was in June 1990, and Milošević was not then very much a tra-
ditional communist, but the bishop did rightly see these two actors as 
the symbols for extreme politics, and in hindsight, he was right. As the 
Orthodox Church and the myths and history of Serbia are intertwined, 
it is easy to see that the church had a nationalistic profile. The Orthodox 
Church in Serbia is by its nature tightly linked to Serbian nationalism, 
and vice versa.32 History is what the Orthodox Church and Serbian 
nationalism had in common. The Church did ask for Serbian unity in 
the elections of 1990 and warned against genocide of Serbs and Ustasha 
27 Thomas (1999, p. ix).
28 Stojanovic (2000, p. 455).
29 Stojanovic (2000, p. 462).
30 Stojanovic (2000, p. 463).
31 Stojanovic (2000, p. 468).
32 Ramet (2005, p. 256).
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in Bosnia.33 The connection between culture and land was strong in the 
church’s rhetoric; for example, the church asked the Bosnian Serbs to 
stay in “their ancestral homes”.34 The church also came to be in a state 
of denial further on, as it denied the existence of concentration camps 
run by Serbs in Bosnia.35
So, the Orthodox Church was very much linked to nationalism in 
Serbia. Belief certainly played a part in Croatia too. The change in the fig-
ures among declared believers in Croatia rose from 47% in 1989 to 76% 
in 1996.36 In the case of the Muslim population of Croatia, one just has 
to mention that much of the violence imposed on these Muslims came 
into force just because they were Muslims. This of course moulded them 
together and strengthened the importance of being a Muslim in Bosnia 
and not just being a Bosnian. Nothing of this suggests that religion 
encourages ethnic cleansing. But religion was important in creating a we 
and by that also creating a they. This in its turn had consequences when it 
came to structuring Yugoslavia into a violent place during the 1990s.
During 1990, Yugoslavia as a project appeared to be a lost cause, 
and the alternatives grew in strength in both Serbia and Croatia. The 
nationalistic rhetoric increased in Croatia, but in Serbia, smaller par-
ties followed the same road, opening up for Milošević to apply a more 
nationalistic approach without looking all too extreme—the latter would 
have scared popular support away. Worth mentioning is that it was not 
only the end of the Cold War that was paramount for the change tak-
ing place but the lack of a democratic heritage in the new multiparty 
state also played a role. Even if Yugoslavia under Tito had been a rather 
benevolent totalitarian state, it still was a totalitarian state which struc-
tured its population and politicians. All in all, the political field was 
restructured by actors whose space of possibility in the given situation 
had changed.
35 Ramet (2005, p. 258).
36 Sekulic et al. (2006, p. 814). See also p. 818 about religion being important in both 
Serbian and Croatian nationalist ideology.
33 Ramet (2005, p. 258). See also p. 262 about church resistance against Milosevic.
34 Ramet (2005, p. 259).
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Abstract  This chapter deals with the final blows against Yugoslavia 
as the state it once was and its eventual reduction to an extension of 
Serbian politics. From the point of legitimacy, one can see this as the 
height of Milošević political career, even if his power would be strong 
well beyond this year. Serbian forces attack eastern Croatia and sack the 
city of Vukovar as the first major hostilities between the two parts of the 
former Yugoslavia.
Keywords  Milošević · Serbia · Croatia · Vukovar · Yugoslavia
Borisav Jovic stepped down as president of SFRY on 15 March 1991, 
when martial laws were turned down—something he advocated given 
the situation. By the same time, March 1991, Milošević had abandoned 
federalism (Plan A), instead of seeking to enlarge the Serbian-controlled 
territory (Plan B). He repeatedly called for “All Serbs in one state”. The 
code for Plan B was the military line, Vojna Linija, which meant covertly 
arming the Serb precani communities, more about that to follow.1 On 
25 March 1991, Milošević and Tudjman met in secret in Karadjordjevo 
and made up common plans for dividing BiH (Bosina and Herzegovina), 
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1 Mann (2005, p. 390). Precani basically means western Serbian settlements, e.g. in 
Croatia.
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at the expense of Muslims, but reached no agreement.2 Tudjman did not 
initially favour Croatian independence for pragmatic reasons: a former 
army general, he feared a JNA invasion. So while bargaining, he was cov-
ertly seeking arms and military advisers abroad (as Izetbegović in Bosnia 
did not). The longer the delay, the more he could arm. Croat emigres 
were important in funnelling money from the USA, Canada and else-
where. In the émigré communities, more than in Croatia itself, Ustasha 
ideology lived on, especially the belief that defending Croatian independ-
ence required armed struggle.3 One could say that those Croats who 
did not want to be restructured under the Yugoslavian communist sys-
tem emigrated from Yugoslavia, often with staunch nationalism in their 
habitus.
During 1990 and 1991, the Bosnian Serb areas had been provided 
with weapons by the Yugoslav Army, as part of the so-called RAM pro-
gramme. The programme had been public knowledge since September 
1991.4 The leading force was the military line where Ratko Mladić 
played a role, but with Milošević’s knowledge.5 Mladić began to have 
increasing political leverage as the situation radicalised, which is note-
worthy as he was no politician, but the restructured field opened up a 
new space of possibilities for him. According to Louis Sell, the political 
takeover of Tudjman’s HDZ regime in Croatia was a major factor for 
this: “But it was Tudjman’s HDZ regime, which the JNA viewed as a 
modern reincarnation of the murderous Ustasha that really made the 
generals see red”.6 Further, weapon smugglers had travelled between all 
parties in Bosnia in the year before the outbreak of war selling weap-
ons under the pretext that weapons had been sold to the other par-
ties.7 It is alleged that this weapon smuggling extended right into the 
Bosnian Parliament. It was therefore not a question of small-scale trad-
ers flogging what they could, but of weapons deals in which members 
of the republic’s Parliament were involved, partly the same people who 
2 Gagnon (2004, p. 103), Mann (2005, p. 381), Naimark (2001, p. 170), see also Donia 
and Fine (1994, p. 210), although without exact dates and places. [Tribunal update 68. 
Stipe Mesic’s testimony, 16–21 March 1998].
3 Mann (2005, p. 377).
4 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 179).
5 Sell (2002, p. 123), Mann (2005, p. 390).
6 Sell (2002, p. 122).
7 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 180).
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had been responsible for throwing the country headlong into war.8  
It was therefore common knowledge, more than half a year before the 
declaration of independence, that the Bosnian Serbs in particular were 
heavily armed.
Early in 1991, Milošević and the Slovenian leader Milan Kučan 
declared each nation’s right to follow its own path, an agreement which 
put Croatia in a difficult position as they were not a part of the agree-
ment but bordered to both of the countries—or rather both parts of 
Yugoslavia.9 On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their inde-
pendence from the Yugoslav Federation.10 This in itself was the mani-
fest defeat of Yugoslavia as a political system and also for the rules of the 
social field of politics in the geographical arena of ex-Yugoslavia. Earlier 
that same month in a statement made in Belgrade, the US Secretary of 
State, James Baker, had announced support for a united Yugoslavia.11 
EU countries such as Austria, Germany, Hungary and Denmark actively 
supported Slovenia’s and Croatia’s efforts to gain independence dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1991.12 France and Great Britain main-
tained a more reserved stance, so the EU was far from united on the 
issue—but in the end it was the active, positive element, not the passive, 
more muted group that won. The parties thus received different mes-
sages from the EU and the USA, which conferred legitimacy for both 
camps, separatist and federalist alike. The ten-day-long war in Slovenia 
ended on 8 July 1991.13 Serbia had no border with Slovenia and neither 
were there any Serbian minorities in the republic, both factors contribut-
ing to Slovenia coming out of the conflict relatively unscathed. Added 
to this was the fact that the Slovenian forces were relatively strong for 
a small constituent republic. The absence of Serbs in Slovenia was also 
something that prevented Milošević from claiming areas of the republic, 
8 “Rovosi u dusi” Zehrudin Isakovic. Vreme 911216, p. 24.
13 Stitkovac (1997, p. 159).
9 Sell (2002, p. 128).
10 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 218).
11 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 220).
12 Woodward (1997, p. 219). It should be noted here that the split within the EU was 
quite marked, with countries like France and Great Britain opposing the separatist line. 
Ibid., p. 223.
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but overall there was a great deal that indicated that a war with Slovenia 
would not be a particularly successful venture.
The Brioni Accord signed on 7 July 1991 was a form of armistice after 
the short Slovenian War. The accord was sanctioned by a significant part 
of the international community, including the EU and the USA. The 
agreement recognised Slovenia’s independence. This, however, invali-
dated the legitimacy of all those within the Yugoslav Army who had been 
willing to take up the cause of Yugoslav unity. There was now no longer 
either international or national support for the idea. Slovenia’s independ-
ence rendered Yugoslavia an army that now had separatism, bloody or 
non-violent, as the only alternative.14 It so happened, however, that the 
strongest separatist forces in Croatia and Serbia were not interested in 
peaceful solutions, which was also no secret to anyone. The army was 
thus driven into the hands of the politicians who were willing to conduct 
their policies using violence to achieve their aims in line with their habi-
tus. To describe the political actions of the countries involved as unwise 
and showing lack of judgement would be an understatement. Milošević 
was able to exploit this effect to strengthen his grip on the Yugoslav 
Army. On his part, it demonstrated a skilful exploitation of the actions 
of other actors, and his knowledge of the local field was overwhelmingly 
the same as that of the international community.
The Badinter Commission was formed in August 1991, when it 
became clear that in one way or another Yugoslavia would become par-
titioned. The Commission’s purpose was to ensure this happened in 
the most fitting manner. It directed that an official referendum should 
be held in Bosnia, ensuring that the three main ethnic groups should 
be strongly represented in the voting process.15 The intention of the 
EU and the Commission was questioned by the Bosnian Serbs. From a 
Bosnian Serbian perspective were the EU not even an actor on the field 
and thus lacked field specific capital‚ which is needed for legitimacy. That 
the EU disposed of other types of capital was of course clear but power is 
certainly not always followed by legitimacy.
14 Woodward (1997, p. 223). See also Sell (2002, p. 146).
15 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 238). See also Sell (2002, p. 163).
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As it has been pointed out by Mann, “the biggest opposition parties 
were even more nationalist than Milošević”.16 This is true and that’s the 
reason why Milošević could go as far as he could and still win a lot of the 
confidence of the people—he didn’t appear all to extreme even if he went 
in that direction—the social field was tilting towards a new logic of prac-
tice. Still, the blame was still very much on Milošević. He was disposed for 
opportunism. There was little reason for him to go against the grain and 
oppose the radical currents which one instead could pick up on and use to 
build power on. Mann also points out that pre-election surveys showed 
that important issues for the people was the communist legacy, the econ-
omy, living standards, good international relations but also the defense of 
the nation.17 The political agenda of the voters looked rather normal for 
a civil society, at least more civil than the agendas of the parties in Serbia. 
What can be said is that the demand of defence of the nation—which is 
perfectly in order to demand—got a dark side in that the definition of the 
borders westward was a part of the contemporary political discussion. It 
is not given that defence of the nation is a defensive stance. Despite that 
Milošević by far had the strongest position on the political field, he did 
not use it to moderate the political climate; instead, he did go with the 
flow of the field as a true opportunist in order to maximise his influence.
Another political actor who temporarily rose to some power, Vojislav 
Šešelj, had experimented with founding a party the year before, 1991. He 
did form SRP (Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva; The Party of Serbian Unity) in 23 
February 1991.18 Šešelj did among a host of other things threaten Croats 
in Vojvodina with expulsion and confiscations and that in no less prominent 
arena than in the Serbian Parliament.19 This was certainly a sign of a new 
political practice in coming. SRP, under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj, did 
from its start work for the dissolution of Yugoslavia and a strong Serbian 
state with Serbia, Montenegro and Krajina within its borders according to 
the Karlobag–Karlovac–Virovitica formula.20 From its start, the SRP did 
form paramilitary units, as a part of its Chetnik modus operandi. They did 
first fight in the Croatian war and later in Bosnia-Hercegovina.21
16 Mann (2005, p. 371).
17 Mann (2005, p. 372).
18 Thomas (1999, p. x).
19 Kerenji (2005, p. 376).
20 Stojanovic (2000, p. 465).
21 Stojanovic (2000, p. 470).
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In August, war broke out between Serbia and Croatia. The sacking 
of the city Vukovar was a brutal affair with high causalities on all sides. 
The JNA did expectedly side with Serbia, or in other words: “The war in 
Croatia fully revealed the teaming up of the Serbian and the army leader-
ships, and turned JNA into an instrument of the Serbian regime’s pol-
icy”.22 It is important to note that the army was very much associated 
with the communist party, which Milošević was the heir of. For exam-
ple had JNA a representation of its own in The League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, which only the Yugoslav republics had representation in.23 
The army was thus integrated into the politics and had power at stake; if 
the system dissolved, then the army would lose power: “The party domi-
nation over the army resulted in the ideological organisation of the JNA, 
and, accordingly of the whole defence system”.24 Still, despite the army’s 
intentions, it didn’t exercise enough control to actually have its soldiers 
to turn up, which also is an indicator of the lack or popular support in 
Serbia for a war in Croatia. The Yugoslav Army was short of 18 divisions 
at the start of the Croatian War. The shortage was the result of deser-
tion and a refusal to report for military service. TV meanwhile served 
to legitimise local nationalism and blinker out moderating opinion.25 
In fact, 50–85% of Serbs called up to fight in Croatia didn’t show up.26 
This is a circumstantial evidence that the war in Croatia but also to an 
extent in Bosnia was more of a top-down war than a bottom-up war.27 
But then again, few wars are forced upon the political leadership by the 
population. Knowledge of this could have made psychological operations 
of value at this stage, certainly as it is not the question of direct mili-
tary intervention which would have been impossible at this stage. One 
can always discuss the value of PSYOPS, but in the end it is an empirical 
question if it is of value on the given situation or not.
The sacking of Vukovar in Eastern Croatia did also include paramili-
tary forces, not only the army. The most notorious was Arkan’s Tigers. 
Arkan was the leader of the football hooligans of the Red Star. These 
22 Hadzic (2000, p. 527).
23 Pesic (1996, p. 44).
24 Hadzic (2000, p. 514).
25 For example, Miloševic (1997, p. 108). For more on the recruiting problem: Sikavica 
(1997, p. 142).
26 Gagnon (2004, p. 109).
27 Gagnon (2004, p. 51).
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hooligans were the core of his “Tigers”.28 Arkan had personal contact 
with Milošević, and Arkan made no secret of his contacts with the state 
security in Serbia.29 The Cetniks under Šešelj also had their own force, 
and Šešelj made gory statements as: “We must cut the Croats’ throats, 
not with a knife but a rusty spoon”.30 This complemented with the 
Chetnik paramilitary group White Eagle’s leader Mirko Jovic who said, 
“We are not only interested in Serbia but in a Christian, Orthodox 
Serbia, with no mosques or unbelievers […] I am all for the clearing 
operations”.31 The Chetniks were armed by the JNA and Arkan’s Tigers 
by the Ministry of Interior of Serbia.32 Vuk Drašković’ SPO also had a 
paramilitary group the “Serbian Guard” which was formed in 1991 
and also saw combat.33 Ironically, Croatian Police captured Arkan in 
November 1990 in Croatia but happened to release him to Belgrade in 
June 1991, just before the war started.34 Fighting did not only occur 
in eastern Croatia, but also in the Serb-dominated Krajina in Croatia. 
Croatia lost control of Krajina between June and December 1991. 
The intention for the local Serbs was to make it a part of the reformed 
Yugoslavia.35
Acting fast, Germany formally recognised Croatia on 23 December 
1991. Neither the EU as an institution nor Germany individually did 
ensure that Croatia held to the guarantees made to the minorities liv-
ing within Croatia’s boundaries.36 This was a signal to the Serbian 
minorities in Croatia—but also in Bosnia—that they would have to rely 
on the remnants of Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia, rather than the international 
community for their security as violence already had been shown in full 
force in other parts of the now defunct state of Yugoslavia. This threat-
ening situation for Serbs was what Milošević had warned against earlier. 
He had been shown right—despite the fact that his reasoning had no 
28 Colovic (1996, p. 386).
29 Miljkovic and Hoare (2005, p. 205). Pavlakovic´ (2005, p. 22).
30 Mann (2005, p. 392).
31 Cited in Mann (2005, p. 392).
32 Mann (2005, p. 392).
33 Stojanovic (2000, p. 475). 12/13 March Draskovic released from prison. Thomas, p. x.
34 Gagnon (2004, p. 147).
35 Lukic´ (2005, p. 55). The conflict in Krajina in 1992 did result in an estimate of 
3000–6000 deaths. Tabeau and Bijak (2005, p. 198).
36 Woodward (1997, p. 226).
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realistic foundation at the time but rather was propagandistic. By failing 
to put pressure on Croatia, the EU managed once again to strengthen 
the legitimacy of Milošević’s policies and his position on the political 
field of Serbia in general (or parts of a Yugoslavian political field if one 
wants to define the social space as such). This was a legitimacy that he 
had previously lacked among many Serbs who earlier had been uncertain 
about him. This was also a decisive blow to the Serbian politicians who 
still sought a peaceful agenda by constitutional civil political means—
they found themselves stripped of their legitimacy as a result of having 
argued against Milošević’s earlier preaching that the international com-
munity was against the Serbs. On the other hand, the war was polaris-
ing and popular support was not necessarily strengthened by making war 
on neighbours. Unsurprisingly, the war reduced Milošević’s popularity. 
Faced by public opposition, in 1991 (and also 1993 due to Bosnia) he 
resorted to coercion. His formidable police powers ultimately swept 
demonstrators off the streets and closed down independent media on 
trumped-up charges.37 Milošević marginalised and tried to silence the 
opposition in 1991.38 One can discuss the media’s role when it came 
to unleashing the more grievous events in the breakup of Yugoslavia. A 
lot of the papers, as Vreme, had a rather balanced view and some got 
in trouble for its criticism against Milošević. But when one looks at a 
social field, one should bear in mind that the vehicles of information 
differ between different social groups but also within general social 
classes, their way of distinction differs. TV Novosti was a weekly Serbian 
paper with the middle class and lower class as primary consumers. On 
12 July 1991, one could read the following in it: “Concealed by the 
so-called ‘Brioni Declaration’, which in fact simply froze the Yugoslav 
Army disaster in Slovenia while obliging the army in Croatia to with-
draw to barracks, leaving the Serb inhabited areas at the mercy of the 
new pro-Ustasha government—whose genocide intentions could not be 
doubted—it is hardly necessary to draw the parallel with the Yugoslav 
catastrophe of April 1941”.39 The reference to the Second World War 
37 Mann (2005, p. 373).
38 Gagnon (2004, p. 103).
39 Cited in Markovic (2000, p. 605).
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is a clear way of giving legitimacy to a construction of history which 
prescribed a violent political agenda. Another example is Illustronova 
Politika which was a weekly Serbian paper with the middle class as target. 
On 30 July 1991, one could read in it: “Our motive is not to allow a 
repeat of 1941 when the Ustasha, the ancestors of today’s HDZ, mas-
sacred the people here”.40 Even here the references are clear: do not be 
a bystander if your people are harassed once again. Historical references 
were used like this to tap further capital into the agendas of those with 
political power.
Others reacted in other ways. The rather belligerent and nationalistic 
Drašković changed his agenda very much after the sacking of Vukovar.41 
Drašković lost influence as he turned his political agenda around; he was 
not convincing as a liberal and old hardliners left.42 His habitus was not 
structured for such a turn. Drašković transformed as a politician and 
wanted peaceful means as political practice. Still, he wanted Croatia to 
cede areas both to Serbia and to BiH (in the latter case, it would be the 
ceding of Krajina from Croatia) (Fig. 7.1).43
It should be emphasised that the dangerous political process described 
above occurred just before the war and sometime into it. The question 
of guilt for this process is not the most relevant, rather how is it that X 
happens. Regardless of intent, one must say that Tudjman, Milošević 
and many other actors were not status quo actors. Tudjman acted on 
behalf of his nationalism and Milošević on his own behalf.44 There were 
as seen structural reasons for things to happen, but one must take both 
actors and structures into account to understand change in society. Some 
researchers have seen a security concern as the root of much of the vio-
lence in Bosnia.45 There is some validity in that statement—as it puts 
emphasis on certain practices and also tries to go for a structural expla-
nation in a reasonable way; even if it does not tell the complete story, 
not all security concerns result in war. With the changing structure after 
40 Cited in Markovic (2000, p. 606).
41 Mann (2005, p. 374).
42 Stojanovic (2000, p. 473).
43 Stojanovic (2000, pp. 463, 474).
44 For an argument about Tudjman and Milosevic not being status quo actors, but from a 
different perspective, see. Roe (2000, p. 386).
45 Dulić and Kostic (2010, p. 1067). I disagree that the events unfolding necessarily 
needed a perceived threat, but I do think that there was such a perception and that it con-
tributed to the events. Ibid., p. 1069. There were more factors in play than just threats for 
these events to unfold.
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the Cold War, new possibilities opened up and some of the actors had a 
social disposition which eventually led to the political field changing and 
hostilities breaking out. There is thus little chance of influencing the pro-
cess other than with firm, clear and forceful diplomacy. Sending troops 
in that phase could only have been done with Yugoslavian approval, and 
was something neither Tudjman nor Milošević would ever have sanc-
tioned. The actual situation at the time was that there were no substan-
tial ground forces available to send from either the EU or the USA, even 
if they had been given a hypothetical green light to deploy to Yugoslavia. 
The political field did not provide any viable alternative; when Yugoslavia 
begun to break up, Milošević’s “all Serbs in one state” had resonance.46 













































Fig. 7.1 A mind map of the political field of the crumbling Yugoslavia with 
some of its actors. The field above shows the positions of a number of key politi-
cal actors on two different occasions. As a result of capital strong actors sanction-
ing violence as a political means, this method gains legitimacy in the political field
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The scene was set both in Croatia and also in Bosnia for a violent near 
future. This was not very hard to perceive taken the turns the politicians 
in the former Yugoslavia had taken and the recent violent logic of prac-
tice of the same politicians.
bibLiograPhy
Colovic, I. (1996). Fudbal, huligani I rat. In Nebojsa Popov (Ed.). Srpska stre-
ana rata (pp. 435–444). Belgrad: Republika. 
Donia, R., & Fine, J. (1994). Bosnia and Herzegovina. A tradition betrayed. 
London: Colombia University Press.
Dulić, T., & Kostic, R. (2010). Yugoslavs in arms: Guerilla tradition, total 
defence and the ethnic security dilemma. Europe-Asia Studies, 62, 7 (New 
York: Routledge).
Gagnon, V. P. (2004). The myth of the ethnic war. Serbia and Croatia in the 
1990s. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hadzic, M. (2000). The army’s use of trauma. In N. Popov (Ed.), The road to 
war in Serbia. Trauma and catharsis. Budapest: Central European University 
Press.
Kerenji, E. (2005). Vojvodina since 1988. In S. P. Ramet & V. Pavlakovic 
(Eds.), Serbia since 1989. Politics and society under Milošević and after. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.
Lukic´, R. (2005). From the federal republic of Yugoslavia to the union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. In S. P. Ramet & V. Pavlakovic (Eds.), Serbia since 
1989. Politics and society under Milošević and after. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press.
Mann, M. (2005). The dark side of democracy. Explaining ethnic cleansing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Markovic, Z. M. (2000). The nation: Victim and vengeance. In N. Popov (Ed.), 
The road to war in Serbia. Trauma and catharsis. Budapest: Central European 
University Press.
Miljkovic, M., & Hoare, M. A. (2005). Crime and the economy under Milošević 
and His successors. In S. P. Ramet & V. Pavlakovic (Eds.), Serbia since 
1989. Politics and society under Milošević and after. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press.
Milošević, M. (1997). The media wars. In J. Udovicki & J. Ridgeway (Eds.), 
Burn this house. The making and unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Naimark, N. M. (2001). Fires of hatred. Ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century 
Europe. Boston: Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College.
86  H. GUNNERIUSSON
Pavlakovic, V. (2005). Serbia transformed? Political dynamics in the Milošević 
Era and after. In S. P. Ramet & V. Pavlakovic (Eds.), Serbia since 1989. Politics 
and society under Milošević and after. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Pesic, V. (1996). Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav 
Crisis.Peaceworks 8, 31, 12. Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace.
Roe, P. (2000). Former Yugoslavia: The security dilemma that never was? 
European Journal of Relations, 6, 373 (London: Sage).
Sell, L. (2002). Slobodan Milošević and the destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham: 
Duke University Press.
Sikavica, S. (1997). The army´s collapse. In J. Udovicki & J. Ridgeway (Eds.), 
Burn this house. The making and unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Stitkovac, E. (1997). Croatia. The first war. In J. Udovicki & J. Ridgeway (Eds.), 
Burn this house. The making and unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Stojanovic, D. (2000). The traumatic circle of the Serbian opposition. In N. 
Popov (Ed.), The road to war in Serbia. Trauma and catharsis. Budapest: 
Central European University Press.
Tabeau, E., & Bijak, J. (2005). War related deaths in the 1992–1995 armed con-
flicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A critique of previous estimates and recent 
results. European Journal of Population, 21, 2. Heidelberg: Springer.
Thomas, R. (1999). Serbia under Milošević politics in the 1990s. London: C Hurst 
& Co Publishers Ltd.
Udovicki, J., & Stitkovac, E. (1997). Bosnia and Hercegovina: The second 
war. In J. Udovicki & J. Ridgeway (Eds.), Burn this house. The making and 
unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke University Press.
Woodward, S. L. (1997). International aspects of the war. In J. Udovicki & J. 
Ridgeway (Eds.), Burn this house. The making and unmaking of Yugoslavia. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
7 THE EVENTS IN 1991  87
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright 
holder.
89
Abstract  This chapter deals with how and why the war emerges in 
Bosnia and how the involved actors acted. Serbian and Croatian lead-
ership with Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, respectively, 
pushed for hostilities all when the leadership in Bosnia with Alija 
Izetbegović and parts of the international community as Germany did 
little to avert the coming disaster.
Keywords  Bosnia · Serbia · Croatia · Alija Izetbegović
As a result of mainly German pressure, the EU followed Germany’s 
action and recognised Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, without 
any guarantees being given to the Serbs living in Croatia.1 The symbolic 
significance of the event was apparently paid such respect that no actual 
countermeasures in the event of conflict were prepared. This recognition 
was as questionable as Germany’s, seeing that Croatia was still not being 
governed in a manner sufficiently satisfactory to preclude internal unrest, 
particularly bearing in mind the problems inherent in the Krajina region. 
One should also remember the lack of guarantee to the minorities in 
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Croatia mentioned earlier; therefore, the Croatian Serbs could not 
expect the support of the international community. They were thus 
forced to seek help from other Serbs, something which the Milošević-
controlled Yugoslav Army had provided in the form of weapons. For the 
Serbs cut off in Croatia, Milošević was therefore seen as a man of vision, 
a defender. To oppose his policies appeared more and more pointless, 
especially when through his actions and as a symbolic figure, he was sup-
ported by a number of actors who did not necessarily have it in mind to 
help Milošević. In this way, the impression that the move of Milošević to 
the right on the field was justified was confirmed in practice, and he was 
now one step ahead. That Milošević’s subsequent manipulative manner 
of introducing violence as a political means can be considered shameful, 
which is not relevant here. In the local arena, a number of reasonably 
well-considered moves at the time by Croatia and other countries served 
to legitimise a shift to the left of the political field.
In this phase, the events displayed in Fig. 7.1 take on a more incisive 
aspect, with politicians inclined towards constitutional means losing capi-
tal in the political field; alternatively, they alter their agenda and move 
to the right side of the field when they realise that the policies that have 
polarised on the right are successful. Fighting between Serbs and Croats 
immediately after Croatia’s declaration of independence took place 
mainly in the Serb-dominated area of the city Knin (Kninska Krajina) in 
Croatian Dalmatia and also in Slavonia. In January 1992, a ceasefire was 
agreed upon which then came into force. This opportunity was exploited 
by transferring troops to Bosnia instead, or, as it might be described, uti-
lising what in clausewitzian terms is called inner lines of communication. 
Bosnia’s president, Izetbegović, failed on Bosnia’s behalf to follow up the 
situation or appreciate the seriousness of disquieting reports of military 
exercises in Bosnia.2
From a military viewpoint, Bosnia was special, with the majority of 
the Yugoslav defence industry being based there. In addition, Bosnia 
throughout history, and especially during the partisan fighting of the 
Second World War, had always been important for the defence of the 
region. The mountainous and forested terrain of the region made it easy 
to defend, and it was therefore here that most of the Yugoslav military 
mobilisation stocks were held; it was planned that the area would act as a 
2 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 183).
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military fulcrum in the event of invasion.3 From a doctrinal perspective, 
giving up Bosnia would be tantamount to surrendering Yugoslavia. This 
appreciation of Bosnia in the military mind has not been brought out in 
literature, but it is an important factor if one is to understand the sce-
nario that came to be played out in that constituent republic.
The Badinter Commission’s intention to get the referendum in Bosnia 
as the civil way dealing with Bosnia’s partition from Yugoslavia did not 
occur. The Bosnian Serbs essentially boycotted the voting for Bosnia’s 
independence on 29 February 1992.4 In January and February, when 
they could have taken the political initiative, the EU was waiting for 
the outcome of a referendum that the Bosnian Serbs had already said 
they would boycott.5 The declaration of the boycott presented an ideal 
opportunity for the EU to get inside the decision cycles of the parties 
involved, but instead, they chose to ignore the information. The EU rec-
ognised Bosnia on April 6, and USA followed suit the next day.6 The 
Bosnian Serbs’ boycott of the referendum was not recorded, and the rec-
ognition of the Bosnian state—without the question of the Bosnian Serb 
position being even discussed—served to legitimise the theory of the 
Bosnian Serb politician, Radovan Karadžić, that the outside world was 
against the Serbs.7 The trigger for the war in Bosnia was the EU’s recog-
nition of the Bosnian state on 6 April 1992.
All was not peaceful in Croatia either. Karadžić became radicalised 
during the war, playing more and more on racism and cultural differ-
ences in his speeches, visiting Orthodox masses to a greater extent, 
increasingly positive to hostage taking and generally having an uncom-
promising attitude.8 Karadžić, however, was an actor in the political field 
3 Donia and Fine (1994, pp. 155 and 174). There was an idea of central defence, strik-
ing out of Bosnia. Not dissimilar to Sweden in the 1800s when Sweden’s defence policy 
was based on defence of the central area of Sweden to strike out from. Bosnia’s impor-
tance for the defence of Yugoslavia can be compared to that of Karlsborg Sweden, and its 
surroundings.
4 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 238). See also Sell (2002, p. 163).
5 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 231).
6 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 236). The authors believe that the USA led this process.
7 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 178).
8 Owen (1995, p. 301).
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by virtue of previously having been a politician, an actor with political 
capital from politics as a parliamentary practice. Thus, when compar-
ing, for example, Karadžić with Mladić, one finds that these two actors 
acquired their legitimacy in the political field from different forms of cap-
ital, which meant that they could also be influenced in ways that them-
selves were different. But to do that one must be aware of the mechanics 
of the field as well as aware of the types of capital the named actors 
stockpiled. Worthy of mention is that opinion polls reported in the paper 
Vreme in 1992 showed a slide in SPS popularity and by that also the pop-
ularity of Milošević. This was especially true in the cities, in the north 
of Serbia, and among the educated. Only 15% of Belgraders supported 
the SPS compared to 51% of those in south Serbia.9 Milošević no longer 
held a strong standing among the Serbs in general.
The Bosnian Serb General Mladić, standing as a political force, was 
greatly improved in power by this change on the field; political power 
came into his reach as the military power he disposed became legitimate 
political tools. Mladić’s authority as a politician was to a large extent 
founded on the use of violence as a political means. If that approach 
became difficult to adopt in the political arena, then Mladić’s position 
would also be undermined. This was something that he himself certainly 
did not have any problem appreciating, even if that appreciation was not 
conducted in theoretical terms. In the picture above, Mladić could be 
replaced with other high-ranking military officers who started to play a 
political role, ones the field had changed. Sir Rupert Smith describes that 
Mladić’s political power came from the weapons at his disposal, which is 
in line with the theory described.10 Smith also describes how attacks on, 
for example, Mladić’s home village were made in order to undermine the 
symbolic capital which Mladić had and thereby undermine his power.11
When Bosnia was recognised as a state on 6 April 1992, all of a 
sudden the Yugoslav Army became a foreign army in the region. This 
happened because the real point at issue had not been debated at an 
9 Mann (2005, p. 373).
10 Smith (2005, p. 367). See also Owen (1995). He describes Mladić as a man conduct-
ing battles partly like an intellectual, partly like a barbarian, p. 280.
11 Smith (2005, p. 366).
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international level, and statements had just been made without further 
analysis. Proposals from the new government of Bosnia to withdraw were 
met by the army’s reply that 80–90% of the troops stationed in the area 
were Bosnian and had no intention of leaving the country.12 At the end 
of April 1992, the Bosnian Serbs took control of the Banja-Luka area in 
Bosnia and almost immediately started using the former local Yugoslav 
TV substation to spread war propaganda.13 A duel was conducted during 
the war in Bosnia between the TV channels of the different (political) 
camps, and a mortar attack on a bread queue in Sarajevo, for instance, 
being given a different slant by both TV Sarajevo and TV Pale.14 It is 
also worth noting that Bosnian TV was also used as an instrument of 
propaganda, promoting the idea, for example, that the war was being 
waged by people who did not live in Bosnia. This was a lie, even if volun-
teers from mainly Croatia and Serbia were represented among the fight-
ing elements.15 In May 1992, 38 generals were purged from the JNA 
to establish Serbian control.16 The Bosnian politicians driving forward 
the move towards independence should most certainly have understood 
that this situation would arise, and they were playing a dangerous game. 
The Bosnian President, and the leader of the Bosnian Muslim Party, 
Alija Izetbegović, chose to declare Bosnia independent, inspired by the 
example set by Croatia, despite other Bosnian Muslim voices warning 
against it.17 Izetbegović apparently misjudged the situation in a grave 
way. It is also relevant that the Bosnian Serb leader, Karadžić, had not 
been at all unclear on the issue of what Bosnia could expect if it hap-
pened to declare independence.18 The situation in Bosnia was much dif-
ferent compared to Croatia and Slovenia, as Robert Hayden discusses.19 
12 Sikavica (1997, p. 146).
13 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 187).
14 Udovicki and Torov (1997, p. 121).
15 Loc. cit.
16 Mann (2005, p. 394).
17 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 175) [Nadezda Gace, “Velika Srbija na mala vrata” 
Vreme 911127, p. 27].
18 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 179) [Roksanda Nincic et al., “Drina bez Cuprije” 
Vreme (weekly anti-war publication, Belgrade), 911021, p. 20].
19 Hayden (1992, p. 661).
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The new Bosnian state did not control most of its territory, which 
really should not come as a surprise to any of those who recognised the 
state. That knowledge combined with the recent acts of violence in for-
mer Yugoslavia should have been enough of a warning of the events to 
unfold.
Even though David Owen had good experience of Alija Izetbegović, 
he did not hesitate to mention that this opinion of Izetbegović was 
not shared by others. Manipulative and untrustworthy are labels which 
were used. But his indecision, which has been mentioned above, is also 
mentioned along with fundamentalistic advisors.20 Owen describes 
Izetbegović’s party SDA as increasingly intolerant, which fits very well 
into the theoretical picture above (Fig. 7.1). In order to keep being a 
political factor, one has an easy option to allow oneself to be radical-
ised by the conflict.21 One can also note that the Bosnian Muslims did 
not identify themselves very much as Muslims before the war, and the 
genocide of them changed that.22 The logic of practice changed the 
perception of the self so that the Bosnian Muslims restructured them-
selves. The former deputy of Carl Bildt—the first high representative 
for Bosnian peace implementation—Louis Sell confirms this with stat-
ing that Izetbegović called for a creation of a Muslim federation from 
Indonesia to Morocco and that media only should be entrusted to peo-
ple of “deeply Islamic faith”.23
Izetbegović’s not being able to judge the situation correctly may per-
haps be explained by the fact that he had poor contact with the Bosnian 
people outside Sarajevo, a city that was to a marked degree multi-eth-
nic and not representative of the rest of Bosnia. In any event, he placed 
far too much hope on the international community’s will and ability to 
intervene. In addition, he had the task of representing different sections 
of Muslim political persuasion, something that contributed further to the 
image of him as indecisive.24 Owen thinks that Sarajevo was besieged by 
both Serbs and the Bosniacs, who got political leverage by having the 
Serbs continue besieging the city. People were not allowed to leave the 
21 Owen (1995, p. 40). See also Sell (2002, p. 5).
22 Gagnon (2004, p. 27).
23 Sell (2002, p. 158).
24 de Graaff (2003, p. 114).
20 Owen (1995, p. 38).
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city as the political positive effect for the besieged would dwindle by 
that.25 There was also documentation of beleaguered Bosniacs draw-
ing Serbian fire on a hospital by placing mortars behind it, and sniper 
fire on civilians in the city from a building controlled by the Bosnian 
Government.26 This theory is plausible as it was a political decision, top 
down, to use the citizens of Sarajevo as a means of politics; it was not 
the people who put themselves in the line of fire. The Bosnian politics 
had hardly any other cards to play than the card of inciting the picture of 
suffering and lack of power, towards the international community, and 
this was one of a few viable ways to conduct international politics for 
Izetbegović and his allies.
This still did not ring enough alarm bells for the Bosnian and inter-
national politicians who chose to act, ignoring the statement by the 
Badinter Commission affirming the need for all three ethnic groups to 
be well-represented in order for the referendum to be considered valid. 
This was certainly evident when the Bosnian Muslim leader Izetbegović, 
under the influence of the USA, withdrew from the EU-supported 
Lisbon agreement in 28 March 1992, which would have divided Bosnia 
into cantons—both the Croats and Serbs agreed to this. The USA tol-
erated the Bosnian Muslims covertly importing weapons from Iran and 
other Muslim countries.27 The Croatians, on the other hand, evaded 
the arms embargo (despite the ineffective resolution UNSCR 713) and 
equipped both themselves and the Bosniacs with arms as no UN surveil-
lance existed between Posavina and Western Herzegovina.28 The recently 
reunited Germany had no use for the old Eastern German munitions it 
had inherited, but Germany had a political agenda in Yugoslavia. Croatia 
had the opportunity, despite the embargo, to buy former DDR heavy 
artillery and tanks with other countries as middlemen. This of course 
stiffened Serbian resistance against demilitarisation, for they still had 
25 Owen (1995, p. 59). One can also note a sniper incident at Sarajevo, performed by 
Bosniacs, killing an UNPROFOR soldier on 8 September 1992. Apparently, it was done 
as an attempt to make it look like a Serbian attack, as the soldier was escorting food to the 
beleaguered Sarajevo. Owen (1995, p. 44).
26 Owen (1995, p.106).
27 Sell (2002, p. 224).
28 Owen (1995, pp. 45, 47 and 315).
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a weapon embargo.29 The situation did a lot to further restructure the 
political field in the remaining Yugoslavian area as it was clear that the 
international community was more against Serbia than was neutral.
All of this is important for outsiders to understand if we in the future 
intend to intervene in situations that might involve the deployment of 
troops. The EU and the USA maybe found it more difficult to see the 
problems in Bosnia, especially when the separatist Bosnian politicians 
did not raise the issues at the international level. But more caution could 
most certainly have been exercised in the period before Bosnia declared 
independence. The signals from the Bosnian Serbs had been clear at the 
time of the referendum. There existed an imbalance in the capacity for 
violence that favoured the Bosnian Serb minority. This made a violent 
interpretation of the field more likely. An important part of the collective 
habitus in the scenario is Yugoslavia’s violent recent past with infight-
ing and ethnic cleansing during World War II, where the capacity for 
violence became a legitimate form of political capital. In addition, the 
party system in Bosnia followed ethnic and not ideological patterns; the 
choice of nationalist party programme was geared to ethnic origin.30 
Tudjman has been described as having power over the political discourse 
and changing it into a hostile one regarding ethnic origin in particular. 
This in its turn could “enhance one’s status in the community”.31 This 
can easily be seen as a social field where the actors with consecrating 
power restructure the field, and other actors either follow the new struc-
ture with their power intact or strengthened, or they resist and might 
eventually lose power as the new structure does not support their choice 
(a conscious choice or not).
The idea of ethnic background dictating dividing lines was nothing 
new for Bosnia as part of the former Yugoslavia, but it stands to reason 
that one can clearly expect problems in a republic that has aspirations of 
independence and that at the same time has ethnic diversity considered 
to be an inherent political issue by all major parties. Added to this, the 
neighbouring countries with the same ethnic diversity had waged a war 
29 Owen (1995, pp. 70 and 74). See also p. 120 for reference that even the Bosniacs had 
gathered an arsenal of quite some substance in 1995. In all honesty, the Serbs had a lot of 
the old Yugoslavian weapon production capacity under control, so they needed allies less 
than others in this respect.
30 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 175).
31 Sekulic et al. (2006, p. 822).
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along the same lines the year before. Given this scenario, there existed 
considerable potential for disaster.
The different opinions among the involved nations about what should 
be done were also a dilemma and a root for inaction and problems. The 
opinion in the USA was strongly anti-Serbian, which in its turn damaged 
the credibility of the peace brokers Cyrus Vance and David Owen and their 
attempts to negotiate a peace.32 The Croats and Bosniacs received signals 
that they had an opportunity for a better deal by the USA than by Vance–
Owen. The Serbs on the other hand saw that there was no united front 
among the European countries and certainly not in relation to the USA.
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Abstract  The empirical example was to show just the initial years of the 
war, but a few things can be said of the last years of the war, without 
being conclusive on the matter. As war went on the violence escalated 
and the escalation gave way for even more violence. The logic of prac-
tice continued to change as the structuring field continued to be restruc-
tured. Without going into details it is worth mentioning that Milošević, 
who already had lost Serbian support, lost even more as he tried to bal-
ance between the international and national arenas at the same time. 
At the same time less international prolific actors could go full out on the 
national arena in support of Serbian interest.
Keywords  The logic of practice · Milošević · Serbia
Vance-Owen had a plan which included keeping the Serbs separated. 
Mainly, Serbia represented by Milošević and Karadžić and Mladić on 
the other hand, representing the Republica Serpska, the Serbian part 
of Bosnia.1 There was some success in this too, in August 1994, Owen 
noted that Karadžić and Milošević competed about being the foremost 
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1 Owen (1995, pp. 105, 134,135, 143, 155, 158, 296 & 302. Especially, 155, 158, 296 
& 302) show cracks between the leaders of Republica Serpska and Milosevic.
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proponent for the Serbs.2 This has similarities with the theoretical idea 
presented here. What the theory suggests is a stronger emphasis on iden-
tification of actors with capacity to political action without violence, and 
by that also identifies those lacking in that capacity. Trying to get Mladić 
away from the political field should then have been paramount, probably 
at the expense of giving both Milošević and Karadžićs more influence in 
the peace process than they had.3 But in hindsight occurrences as the 
drawn-out siege of Sarajevo could have been shortened and the genocide 
in Srebrenica could have been avoided.
In addition to Bosnia’s internal problems, one must also consider the 
situation in Yugoslavia as a whole. Despite the fact that the various ethnic 
groups in Bosnia appeared to get on well together—at least there had 
been no outbreaks of violence—the two leaders of Serbia and Croatia, 
Milošević and Tudjman had, as has been mentioned, met in 1991 and 
decided to split Bosnia between them. The agreement was thus struck 
two months after Croatia and Serbia had declared an armistice, showing 
that it was calculating statesmanship rather than irreconcilable nation-
alism that was guiding the two politicians. The two had already taken 
steps to prepare for military operations in Bosnia.4 In addition, small 
elements of the Serbian and Croatian forces in Bosnia had moved on 
from the initial phase of murders committed by just small elite groups 
2 Owen (1995, p. 302). See also Sell (2002, p. 230).
3 I am not saying that efforts were not made to separate Karadic and Mladić, but appar-
ently they did not succeed that well. Owen (1995, p. 352).
4 Donia and Fine (1994, p. 227). The authors highlight the infiltration of both Serbian 
troops from Krajina and Croat internal forces. Their views on another matter are unclear, 
because they are somewhat ambiguous. They refer to the fact that the Yugoslav Army used 
Bosnia for their operations in Croatia. Firstly, the war with Croatia was already over by 
the time of the Bosnian crisis, secondly—if they still claim that there were activities during 
the Croatian War which affected things in some uncertain way—the Yugoslav Army was 
for quite natural reasons and fully legitimately in Bosnia. It is difficult to imagine that the 
Yugoslav Army could have acted in any other way, but it is clear that the tension in Bosnia 
could have been increased as a result of all this, regardless of the right of the Yugoslav 
Army to be in Bosnia in 1991. This is particularly relevant considering that the Brioni 
Agreement made the idea of a united Yugoslavia an untenable strategy for the Yugoslav 
Army to align itself with. It was thus a time of uncertainty for the Yugoslav Army, not 
knowing to which country they belonged or whose army they were.
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of paramilitaries and were now more readily disposed to carry out ethnic 
cleansing. For example, Vojislav Šešelj’s party SRS had troops in Bosnia.5 
The stage was set for an exceptionally brutal and bloody war that could 
well have been avoided. In the end, the Serbs in Croatia did pay a severe 
price, or as Rupert Smith puts it:
The ethnic cleansing of the Croatian Serbs from Croatia was a prime 
example of the dynamics of the “theatre of war”. While recorded and 
displayed at the time, the act was never attacked in the media for what it 
really was: the expulsion of a minority by a state from their homes on the 
basis of their ethnicity, and the failure of the UN to protect them, par-
ticularly as this, was the original purpose of the UN deployment.6
The very occurrence of starvation, ethnic cleansing and other active 
efforts of the participants also became a tool not only to rewrite the eth-
nic map of Yugoslavia, but also to affect the international community. 
“So ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia was old, but neither ancient nor contin-
uous; and though it intensified in the 20th century, it did so unevenly”.7 
Rupert Smith became aware of that during his stint as a commander 
in Bosnia and he confirms that the researchers Jan Willem Honig and 
Norbert Both were right in their statement:
The Muslim pockets were used by the [Bosniac] Sarajevo government in 
November (1992) as pressure points on the international community for 
firmer action. The longer that aid convoys were unable to reach them, 
the greater the pressure on the mandate. When convoys did succeed, calls 
for firmer action were unwarranted. Two weeks after the first successful 
delivery Muslims [Bosniacs] launched an offensive towards Bratunac [a 
Serb-held town just outside the besieged Srebrenica]. Thus the integrity 
of UNHCR and UNPROFOR was undermined, further convoys were 
impossible, and the pressure for firmer action resumed.8
What one can see from this is that—apart from the ruthlessness from the 
involved local parts—the violence was politicised and that prestige could 
5 Gagnon (2004, p. 50).
6 Smith (2005, p. 362).
7 Mann (2005, p. 359).
8 Honig and Both (1996, p. 80), quoted in Smith (2005, p. 337). Owen notes that UN 
“knew” that Mladić would not honour any safe areas which were not demilitarised. Owen 
(1995, p. 67).
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be won for all parts, even the international community, both through 
suffering but also through violence. Noteworthy is that the Commander 
in Chief of the Bosnian Serbian Drina Corps, General Krstić, said that 
none of the officers refused the orders in the Srebrenica massacre later 
on in the war in 1995.9 By being a perpetrator one could also show that 
one was an important political player on the violent political field. This 
was especially important for actors like general Mladić, who had little 
political credibility beyond the political violence he could wield.
Rupert Smith has stated that “There was no strategic direction, there 
was no strategic military goal to achieve, there was no military cam-
paign and there were no theatre-level military objectives: all acts were 
tactical”.10 That was a description of the planning for the international 
forces. If they had used a theoretical model similar to the one presented 
in this text, they might have been able to forge their tactical acts into 
some kind of operational and finally tactical pattern. The local factions 
were not equally unaware of the game which they all were involved in. 
Finally, NATO decided to act against Milošević and the Bosnian Serbian 
leaders and the UNPROFOR soldiers changed helmets from their blue 
to green—morphing into IFOR—while the bomb war started. This also 
gave the green light for the ethnic cleansing in Croatia of the Krajina. In 
early August 1995, about 150,000 Serbs were ethnically cleansed from 
Krajina, the largest single cleansing during the war.11 The escalated use 
of violence as a legitimate political tool struck back at the Croatian Serbs, 
as the whole political field transformed into a social field where violence 
became the most effective way to wage politics—the Croatian state was 
no exception. One can compare it with the war related deaths in Bosnia 
during the war, 67,630 (minimum) or an estimate of 102,622 individu-
als.12 The emigration from Bosnia (for whatever reason) as a result of the 
war is approximately 1.2 million individuals (27% of the population).13
The events following in Kosovo 1999 were also a major stroke 
against Serbia. It can serve as an example of how much symbolic capital 
9 Mann (2005, p. 396).
10 Smith (2005, p. 336).
11 Owen (1995, p. 329 & 353).
12 Tabeau and Bijak (2005, pp. 203 & 207).
13 Tabeau and Bijak (2005, p. 209).
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Milošević’s Serbia had lost internationally during the process of war. 
At that point, Serbia lacked so much symbolic capital that anything 
could pass as legitimate in order to weaken the state of Serbia. As the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo states, “the NATO 
military intervention was illegal but legitimate” [sic].14 In other words, 
there was enough symbolic value mustered to act against Serbia to make 
it legitimate despite formal writings. Russia was also weak during the 
bombings. Albeit they opposed the separations of Kosovo from Serbia, 
it did not mean much more at the time than spreading the symbolic vio-
lence to Russia as well. As we will see in the next chapter, Russia took 
notes in a way which the commission did not foresee in its conclusions.
Media deserves a special comment as media is powerful when it comes 
to affecting a social field in a society which is used to gather informa-
tion by accessing media. Previously media has been mentioned as a 
means to affect diaspora or the population. The media and war have 
been interconnected as long as legitimacy has been a term of relevance. 
Modern thinkers such as Paul Virilio have taken the relationship of the 
media with war a stage further.15 This will not be examined here, but 
it is just one more example of how theory can provide a perspective on 
and a valued explanation of war in empirical terms. In November 1994 
when the war in Bosnia was creating bad will for Milošević, he shut 
down the newspaper Borba after it was critical of Milošević.16 Repression 
against autonomous media is not unheard of and there are reasons for 
it as it affects the discourse on the events in a way not always benevo-
lent to those in power. Another example of Milošević’s awareness of the 
use of media was when he asked Carl Bildt for permission to use televi-
sion against Karadžić, at the time when an agreement between Bildt and 
Milošević was made and a rift between the former and Karadžić was cre-
ated.17 Another example of the media war was when the authorities were 
still sending TV propaganda as late as March 1996 when the Serbs were 
driven out of Sarajevo.18
14 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000, p. 4).
15 See in particular Paul Virilio’s book on the Gulf War: Desert Screen.
16 Pavlakovic´ (2005, p. 21).
17 Sell (2002, p. 229).
18 Udovicki and Stitkovac (1997, p. 200).
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Television is an excellent means for the conduct of PSYOPS, especially 
if the warring parties and the local population both produce and watch 
TV. Clumsy efforts to conduct a media war were occasionally made by 
the international forces, for example by the USA through IFOR. This 
comment refers specifically to the fact that the TV media was not utilised 
constructively to any great degree by IFOR; that not much control of pro-
gramme content was exercised, and that undesirable programmes could 
have been cut out when they appeared. In the case of 1996 above, IFOR 
was present on the ground and had the ability to act, at least in the media 
field. Instead, at first, IFOR concentrated on radio channels. The conclu-
sion later was that most people watched TV and were not influenced by 
radio to any great degree. This was a badly judged strategy, which could 
have been changed to another by some doing some HUMINT.19 The 
situation was also not helped by the fact that the Americans, true to prac-
tice at home in the USA, broadcast on AM radio, when the Yugoslavs in 
general—just like in other countries with only FM channels—hardly ever 
had any cause to switch from their FM radio settings.20 A border was 
breached—which resulted in NATO troops confiscating Serb TV trans-
mitters—when clips of SFOR (Stabilisation Force) troops were mixed 
with old clips of German Nazi troops in the programs.21 Throughout 
the whole process, from the start of the war to the midst of it, television 
was used effectively as a weapon of war by all parties. The purpose of the 
media campaign was to legitimise the international presence actions in the 
local Bosnian arena, a strategy that to a great extent focused on the strug-
gle for symbolic capital on the political social field.
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Abstract  The discussion above demonstrates that it is possible to 
acquire useful knowledge for military purposes by studying the prel-
ude to the conflict in Bosnia from a field theory perspective. As seen the 
method here is more the historian’s than one which one would need on 
a contemporary example. But the case here was to present the use of the 
theory, not of the methods. As has been said earlier, one can use almost 
any kind of method when one works with field theory.
Keywords  Bosnia · Field theory · PSYOPS
The course of events was described from the strategic down to the 
 operational level as appropriate to the discussion. If the international 
community had made serious efforts to consider the effects they wanted 
to achieve, apart from those for a very short term, they would pos-
sibly have acted differently. It involves consequence analysis, but also 
looking at the overall political situation. It was a question of not fully 
 understanding the logic of the field. If one does not understand how the 
field works then neither will one be able to progress to the next stage and 
possibly use field theory as a tool. What do the actors want to achieve and 
how can they be persuaded to change strategy? These questions should 
serve to direct the handling of this type of situation. An analysis of events 
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was conducted using field theory, with the theoretical terms sometimes 
clearly shown and sometimes indicated through the use of synonyms. 
Even though the actors did not always think in field theory terms, it 
is still possible to apply that perspective. To that should be added that 
much indicates that Milošević and Tudjman, without any actual theoreti-
cal knowledge, could think and act in a manner reminiscent of the field 
theory approach. That is something you can and also probably actually 
do if you are an actor on the field. The opposite can be said about many 
of the other actors who really did not try to understand the social field 
and thus really did not take the duel-situation between them and their 
counterparts seriously.
One can also see that it was possible to extrapolate the coming events 
by studying the actors and that their rationality also could be perceived. 
This is exactly the information one needs if one wants to affect actors 
by changing the social structure on a field. PSYOPS could be applied 
right through the whole event chain, not only during the phase when 
open war was played out. Even a bombing or an assassination of other 
actors than those you want to affect can be part of a PSYOPS operation. 
Exactly what could have been done is speculative and beyond the point 
of this text. The important thing is that it was possible to operate in this 
setting with a social field perspective as guidance.
The aim has been to show that field theory can fulfil the criteria neces-
sary for a theory to qualify as a valuable instrument for military planning. 
The discussion has demonstrated that social theory can be employed as 
an operational tool. The theory can serve to encourage reflection and 
therefore refine one’s thoughts, provided that it is first understood and 
assimilated as a way of thinking. This provision was fulfilled when the 
theory was shown to be able to be linked, for example, to the questions 
and issues that a military intervention might have to face. The theory 
was also shown to be applicable to the empirical example given. One 
counter to this claim is of course that it is a theoretical examination of 
empirical data that has been conducted. The next step is to apply the 
theory in an actual empirical study. But for this to be possible the the-
ory must first be further developed and then practical measures taken to 
enable theoretical ambitions to be realised—in other words a task outside 
this study. One question that is inherent and needs to be answered fol-
lowing this type of study is: what resources are required to enable the 
creation of a field theory image of military area of operations?
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As shown above, it might seem an easy thing to identify how the 
enemy is structured and what his possibilities are on the social field, 
and by that outmanoeuvre him. But as Carl von Clausewitz stated 
“Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult”.1 
What is the catch then? There are certainly many, but now when we 
have this perspective laid out in front of us, then we can go one step 
further. We have already discussed that people are structured to value 
certain things on a social field and that they are also structured to most 
likely not do certain things according to their habitus. But these limita-
tions apply to the other side as well, to our forces or our allies. We are 
structured by our culture, upbringing, regulations, rules and schooling 
in general to do certain things and not do others. On top of that we 
are not only becoming an actor on the local political field, we are at the 
same time acting on a multitude of other social fields. Our forces are, 
for example, acting on a military social field, with its own rules, values 
and limitations. These limitations from our own culture leave us severely 
limited when it comes to fitting our actions towards a local social field, 
and against the habitus of the local actors (collective or individual ones), 
or just trying to act together with allies can actually provide a daunt-
ing task as collective habitus varies between nations and organisations. 
Things which might make sense for us might be counterproductive seen 
from the local perspective. For example, forbidding all Baath party mem-
bers to be employed by the US administration in Iraq might have been a 
good idea if it was not almost equal to forbidding anyone having knowl-
edge of administration to have a job within the Iraqi state. Or the ini-
tial idea to leave out the high priests of Iraq from the political process 
was clearly a misunderstanding of the political role Islam had and still has 
in Iraq.
By way of a start it is suggested that the approach would be inter-
esting to apply to a staff exercise. A number of practical questions need 
to be examined, which would be best addressed by conducting an exer-
cise in the form of an experiment. There will certainly be some need 
for the staff to have read up on Pierre Bourdieu, at least one or two of 
the more solid works he has written, like Logic of Practice, The Rules of 
Art, The Field of Cultural Production, or why not his earliest field study 
on the Kabyle Outline of a Theory of Practice. As an example of this, an 
1 Carl von Clausewitz (1991). Book 1, Chap. 7.
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important type of issue is where the borderline between the operational 
and the two strategic levels goes when conducting an analysis of the 
field. In an operational assessment of the field, ne might consider setting 
priority on a particular process to examine the structure of the field, so 
that certain actors, who for political reasons should not be engaged, are 
affected in a negative way. This will of course generate frictions. These 
frictions, however, lie embedded in the different levels of the structure, 
rather than as a result of the application of field theory. The latter is 
more directed towards illuminating problems and provides an overall pic-
ture to which the various levels of command can refer. However, exactly 
how this will happen is an empirical issue best examined through experi-
ment. What the study does bring to light is that field theory will be most 
effective if the intervention force is in the operations area for a protracted 
period, when comprehensive information gathering can be conducted 
and be fruitful in the long run.
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Abstract  With the recent development of Russian international politics, 
it is of interest to revisit Yugoslavia and discuss the lessons learnt there in 
the light of hybrid warfare. The events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s resem-
ble in parts to what has been described as hybrid warfare in Ukraine in 
2014–2017.
Keywords  Hybrid warfare · Russia · Kosovo · Ukraine
Hybrid warfare has as a term travelled a lot in definition. It started as 
a description of the Israeli debacle in Lebanon 2006, there it was seen 
as an empirical theorisation of Hezbollah possessing advanced weapon 
systems and still not being a state actor.1 From there, one can specu-
late what the new hybrid threats can constitute from both future inven-
tions as nanotechnology and biohacking to contemporary cyber threats.2  
1 Håkan Gunneriusson (2012, p. 49). Much inspiration has been given by Frank G. 
Hoffman and his work on hybrid threats. Frank G. Hoffman (2009).
2 Ibid. p. 63 and Håkan Gunneriusson and Rain Ottis (2013).
112  H. GUNNERIUSSON
The war in Ukraine which started with the Russian annexation of Crimea 
can be said to take the term hybrid warfare into another direction.3
The Russian occupation and the following annexation of the Crimea 
peninsula were very much enabled because the large number of ethnic 
Russians on the peninsula. Some were for the annexation; some were 
bystanders and some others were against it. But they gave a minimum 
of legitimacy to the occupation as it could be claimed that the popula-
tion wanted to secede from Ukraine and join Russia. There is a history 
to this and it be explained with Yugoslavia as an inspiring scenario. The 
term hybrid warfare was not conceptualised back then, but it may as well 
have been forged. There are similarities between the Crimea annexation 
and some of the elements in the break-up of Yugoslavia. There was an 
urge to create nation states to replace Yugoslavia which encompassed 
many different Slavic nations. This can be seen and was also seen as a 
state building process, more than an example of hybrid warfare. The 
break-up did not happen by proxy as in Crimea. The cleansing of Knin 
(Kninska Krajina) in Croatia, on the other hand, can be seen through 
the perspective of hybrid warfare even if the term still was not concep-
tualised, and the Serbian minority’s claim for autonomy from Croatia 
was unsuccessful as a whole. The Serbs, who undoubtedly had lived in 
the region for hundreds of years, wanted to secede from the new state 
of Croatia, they declared themselves autonomous. The support from 
another new state, Serbia, can be seen as a parallel to the Russian sup-
port in Crimea and Russia’s proxy involvement there.4 The difference 
was that Serbia lacked all resources to effectively include Knin in its war 
efforts—at least beyond rhetorical statements. Furthermore, there was 
just an ad hoc plan without further thought of support to Knin from 
Serbia, in effect not just a lack of capacity but a lack of planning too. The 
3 Sascha Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson (2017).
Håkan Gunneriusson and Sascha Bachmann (2015a, b). More about hybrid warfare in 
Håkan Gunneriusson and Sascha Bachmann (2015a, b). Håkan Gunneriusson and Sascha 
Bachmann (2014). Håkan Gunneriusson and Sascha Bachmann (2017). Amos C. F., and 
Rossow A.J. (2017).
4 The lack of land connection between the splinter region and the country encouraging 
the break up exists in both examples. This is of course not an argument for hybrid warfare, 
but it can be stated just to remind that the Knin was as much of a satellite of the ethnic 
mother country as Crimea is.
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claim of independence by the local Serbs was based on the fact that the 
Serbs lived in Knin, there was no doctrine other than nationalistic ethos. 
Further, Serbia under Milošević lacked all types of symbolic capital to 
successfully wager such claims for their own part or for that part for Knin 
as a separate entity. Russia, an active supporter of Serbia then and now, 
stood by and could nothing do. During Yugoslavia’s downfall, Russia 
was weak both politically and military. All Russia could do was to take 
notes for their new doctrine while it was a one-off operation for NATO, 
as with the example of Kosovo discussed below.5 Did they do that? Most 
certainly, if not anything else the head of Russia’s General staff and the 
creator of its contemporary doctrine Valerij Gerasimov himself states that 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s was an example of NATO hybrid warfare.6
Another example of a proto-hybrid event is the administrative unit of 
the Republic of Srpska, which consisted of the eastern part of Bosnia. 
The Republic of Srpska is by no means recognised as a separate state, 
it is still a part of Bosnia but has little to do with the rest of the coun-
try and the issue is settled as being so for the time being. Autonomy for 
the area is thus not achieved, nor does Serbia formally control the ter-
ritory, so this proto-hybrid warfare event was merely semi-successful. If 
Serbia had the political and foremost comparative military leverage, they 
could easily have done or yet still do a Crimean hybrid warfare operation 
there at any time. But being military weak and in the political process of 
joining the EU there is little to gain by such an approach, they did not 
have or currently have the capacity to act freely. We have to look else-
where at the parting of Yugoslavia to find a more hybrid-like scenario. 
Something classified as a successful hybrid warfare operation can be said 
to have happened in the example of Kosovo. This is a good example as 
the process of splitting Kosovo from Serbia was very sensitive for the 
regime in Russia, and they took it as an unfair stripping of territory from 
its ally Serbia. This is not dissimilar to the Crimea situation with the USA 
5 The mastermind behind Russia’s new doctrine is Valery Gerasimov. He presented his 
ideas in the following article: “The value of science in anticipation. New challenges require 
rethinking the forms and methods of warfare”. http://www.vpknews.ru/articles/14632 
[170509].
6 VPK News, number 10 (674) 15th March 2017, abridged version of the report 
“Modern War and current national defence issues” (authors translation) for the Academy 
of War studies. http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/35591 [170509].
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backing Ukraine and Russia separating Crimea from Ukraine. In the 
process of separating Kosovo, it was a stroke of symbolic violence that 
NATO delivered to Russia, displaying Russian weakness in the Balkans 
and overall. It also presented Russia with the pretext for its operation in 
Crimea, the sword of seceding showed to be two-edged and thus use-
ful for Russia as well. Kosovo was staged carefully by the USA and her 
allies and backed both by civilian tools represented by the UN as well 
as the OSCE, including the military tool—NATO. Pushing for a greater 
self-governing of Kosovo initially, NATO presenting a peace treaty to the 
Serbs. However, this treaty included a paragraph that certainly would be 
hard for any state to accept as it included free movement and bases by 
a foreign military alliance (NATO) on the sovereign soil of Serbia and 
free movement through all of Serbia for NATO-troops. This paragraph 
ensured that the treaty failed and opened for military aggression. It can 
be argued back and forth if this paragraph really mattered, if it was raised 
by the Serbs or not in the negotiations.7 What is not debatable is that 
the paragraph was in the agreement refused by the Serbs. Refusal by the 
Serbs led to aggression on part of the international community with a 
few expectations and after a 10-week long ordeal Serbia finally agreed to 
the terms of NATO. The United Nations and OSCE quickly deployed 
and started the building of local and central institutions for governing of 
a state.8 Furthermore, the legal framework was more or less completely 
changed in the nine years that followed until the Kosovo Albanians 
declared unilateral independence, backed on the way there and after by 
NATO as led by the USA.9 The illusio, the rules of the field of inter-
national law, was changed with Kosovo, and the change was then con-
firmed with Crimea when two major international actors on the field, 
NATO and Russia, had used this new logic of practice for international 
law.10 Important to note is that the actions taken to separate Kosovo 
from Serbia was an ad hoc solution to a problem limited in time and 
space. Nothing else came out of this new way to interpret international 
7 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/682877.stm [170509].
8 http://www.osce.org/ [170509].
9 The change of the legal system and various institutions were facilitated by the United 
Nations and the OSCE through the backing by member states, as well as aid provided by 
the EU, USAiD and DiFiD to just name a few.
10 Instead of new one can see it as a reversal of the old practice of Realpolitik. 
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law. Russia took notes and saw a new pattern in this, a new way to act 
and added it to its foundation for contemporary warfare. They re-coded 
their understanding of warfare so that they could have their way with 
their neighbours like Georgia and Ukraine, primarily while still claim-
ing deniability. One can with right argue that Russia also lacked sym-
bolic capital in their claim to Crimea, as for Serbia in the Knin example 
above. But Russia could point to a host of factors in favour of Russia. 
Among them the claim that Crimea historically (pre-Stalin) was Russian, 
along with the ethnic presence of Russians there. More importantly, the 
ability to pursue a narrative like the one of Putin’s Russia can be fruit-
ful from their perspective. The loss of Kosovo for the Serbs can be seen 
as both as a material loss and a symbolic loss. Russia used the narrative 
from the case of Kosovo, even if not openly stating it, as a legitimating 
tool for the annexation of Crimea. It helped them in their effort to build 
the required minimum of legitimization for their annexation, at least 
they can hold an argument for it. Furthermore, Russia’s massive military 
supremacy in the region talks for Russia’s success as there is not really 
much to do in military terms about Russia’s activities in Ukraine; real-
politik beats finesse in many cases, as in this example. That is the reason 
why the EU and NATO do not stand up for conventions against war of 
aggression in the case of Ukraine. The West do not have the capability 
to challenge Russia in the region, so it is easier to look the other way. It 
can be seen as a case of Reflexive control. This is an old Soviet approach 
called reflexive control. The psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre defines 
reflexive control as “a process by which one enemy transmits the reasons 
or bases for making decisions to another”.11 The concept of reflexive 
control can in fact be used with bourdeiuan field theory as approach as 
there are similarities shown in this text. The author Timothy Thomas 
means that reflexive control can be used on all levels of warfare.12 One of 
the most complex influence operations is to influence a state’s decision-
making process.13 Russia’s warfare against the West can be described as 
reflexive control, resulting in hybrid warfare.
11 Quoted in Timothy (2004. p. 238).
17, 2004. https://www.rit.edu/~w-cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.
12 Timothy (2004. p. 239).
17, 2004. https://www.rit.edu/~w-cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.
13 Ibid, Thomas, L. Timothy.
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In the case with EU and NATO vs Russia today, we have a differ-
ence compared to the cold war; even if we do not believe the Russian 
narrative at all, we still do not challenge it fully and call Russia out for 
waging a war of aggression in Ukraine. Nevertheless, Russia’s warfare 
against Western power can be described as reflexive control, resulting in 
hybrid warfare in the meeting with the Western powers. It all depends on 
who is listening, but Russia clearly sent a message to all in the region and 
beyond, no matter what they thought about it. The Russian doctrinal 
stance of hybrid warfare is now operational, and we have yet to see the 
end of it.
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